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WRONGFUL DEATH IN AVIATION AND THE




The lack of a uniform standard of recovery under state wrongful death
statutes has spawned numerous problems unique to the aviation and
shipping industries. Although both industries deal almost exclusively
in interstate and foreign commerce, Congress has refused to enact federal
wrongful death legislation that would control situations interferring with
a state's interest in the application of its law. The resulting uncertainty
provokes confusion. In cases invoking the admiralty jurisdiction, for
example, state wrongful death law, utilized to grant relief otherwise not
available, has often provided more restrictive remedies than would be
the case under the maritime law, thus retarding effective application of
federal standards. The Supreme Court, however, has recently eliminated
part of the confusion by holding that an unseaworthiness remedy for
wrongful death in state waters exists under the general maritime law.
Drawing a parallel of air and sea commerce, the authors propose an
analysis based on the broad policies of maritime recovery for wrongful
death and suggest that the same arguments are available to the federal
courts for the creation of a federal common law of aviation.
"Nothing is more certain in modem
society than the principle that there
are no absolutes, that a name, a
phrase, a standard has meaning only
when associated with the considera-
tions which gave birth to the nomen-
clature."
Mr. Justice Vinson in Dennis v. United States
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Problems of Federalism
The federal courts have had increasing difficulty determining the ap-
plicable law in damage suits brought under a wrongful death statute
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as a result of a wrongful act of an interstate carrier. One problem is that
federal legislation in this area is not always available nor, when avail-
able, always illuminating.' Even when Congress enacts decisional rules,
it generally does so on an ad hoc basis, and then only to accomplish a
limited purpose' or to meet a situation that appears beyond judicial
' Compare Sinkler v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 356 U.S. 326, 332-34 (1958) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) with Raudenbush v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 160 F.2d 363 (3rd Cir. 1947)
and Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 35 U.S.L.W. 2609, 10 Av. Cas. 17,179 (3rd Cir.
March 30, 1967) (not officially cited), rev'd on rehearing en banc, 399 F.2d 14 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 979 (1968), noted in 34 J. AIR L. & CoM. 651 (1968).
Cf. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886) (admiralty). For general discussions, see
Moore & Pelaez, Admiralty Jurisdiction-The Sky's the Limit, 33 J. AIR L. & COM.
3 (1967); Comment, Aviation Challenges Admiralty Jurisdiction: Sink or Swim in the
Sea of Uncertainty, 35 J. AIR L. & CoM. 616 (1969). See also Tydings, Air Crash
Litigation: A Judicial Problem and a Congressional Solution, 18 AM. U.L. REv. 299
(1969).
'A statute is often so vague that even its application to a particular controversy is
unclear. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1964) with Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330
U.S. 485 (1947). See United States v. Devonian Gas & Oil Co., 424 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.),
modified on other grounds, 424 F.2d 471 (1970) (construing The Seneca Leasing Act,
25 U.S.C. § 177 (1950)). A classic example concerns the Death on the High Seas Act,
46 U.S.C. §5 1, 7 (1964). When section seven was originally reported out of committee
it provided that "the provisions of any state statute giving or regulating rights of action
or remedies for death shall not be affected by this act as to causes of action accruing
within the territorial limits of any state." 59 CONG. REC. 4482 (1920). Whether the act
was to supersede the legislative power of the states concerning the high seas was rendered
uncertain, however, by the last minute adoption of the Mann Amendment, which
changed the section to read: "The provisions of any state statute giving or regulating
rights of action or remedies for death shall not be affected by the Act." The change was
accepted as merely semantical, probably in order to facilitate passage. See 59 CONG. REC.
4674 (1920). Nevertheless, one of the principal purposes of the legislation, which was to
end the confusion caused by the application of state wrongful death statutes in this area,
was almost completely negated; see S. REP. No. 216, 66th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. REP.
No. 674, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. (1920). Cf. Lindstrom v. International Nay. Co., 117 F.
170, 173 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1902). The confusion continued until the federal courts finally
held that the act superseded state law in situations occurring on the high seas on the
basis of the needed uniformity of the general maritime law. See, e.g., Middleton v. Luck-
enbach S.S. Co., 70 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1934). Cf. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S.
205 (1917). For a historical discussion, see Hughes, Death Actions in Admiralty, 31
YALE L.J. 115 (1921). See also Comment, 51 CAL. L. REv. 389 (1963).
4 For example, from 1886 until 1920 an action in admiralty was unavailable to the
dependents of a person killed at sea. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886). The Death
on the High Seas Act was enacted to provide the wrongful death action missing in ad-
miralty and to create uniformity in death actions arising beyond state territorial waters.
59 CONG. REC. 4482-83 (1920); Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85, 90, n.
22 (N.D. Cal. 1954). The difficulties in the rules governing liability for injury or death
in the various forms of transportation are caused in part by judges, in part by legislators.
The inconsistencies are apparent. If an airline employee is injured or killed, recovery of
a fixed amount is usually granted by a state's workmen's compensation act, without proof
of fault. See Fliteways, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 249 Wis. 496, 24 N.W.2d 900 (1946).
On the other hand, if a railroad employee is injured or killed on an interstate railroad,
recovery is based on a federal statute and the proof of negligence. Federal Employer's
Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. 55 51-60 (1964). Cf. Sinkler v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 356 U.S. 326 (1958). In admiralty, judge-made law and legislation
combine to form a maze of rules. Compare Dragich v. Strika, 309 F.2d 161 (9th Cir.
1962) (recovery for Parkinson's Disease under the judicially created doctrine of main-
tenance and cure) with The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964) (seamen's recovery for
negligence). Cf. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). The Longshoremen's
and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1964), is a federal remedy
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solution Moreover, rapid technological expansion, characteristic of
the transportation industry, often creates issues that have not been
legislatively resolved! When handed these problems, the federal courts
not only lack meaningful precedent for deciding the rights of litigants
before them, but also are often burdened with a piecemeal legislative
scheme uncomfortably applied.!
The principal difficulty originates in the ill-defined concept of "federal-
ism," the idea that the federal judiciary is an organ of limited powers
within a government of limited powers; federal intrusion in areas of
state competence is justified only when the reasons are exceptional.'
Death actions involve areas where the states have traditional competence
to prescribe rules of decision and where Congress is therefore only rarely
similar to state workmen's compensation acts and also provides recovery for unsea-
worthiness on the ground that longshoremen and harbor workers perform tasks tradi-
tionally done by seamen. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953). The
unseaworthiness remedy is available to seamen, but not under the Jones Act. Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 396 n. 12 (1970). Cf. Gillespie v. United States
Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964); Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930). See
generally Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who
Won't, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 787 (1963); Note, 36 J. Am L. & CoM. 745, 756-57 (1970).
1 See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 470 (1942)
(concurring opinion).
I See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAws 72 (48th Conference 1938) (remarks of Mr. William A. Schnader).
'See Scott v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
979 (1968); Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, 316 F.2d 758 (3rd Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 940 (1964). The problem became complex with the advent of air travel cre-
ating the possibility of a wrongful act occurring ashore while the injury or death takes
place at sea. See Lacey v. L. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 916 (D. Mass. 1951)
(Death on the High Seas Act operates as if the accident took place on the high seas).
See also Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85, 92 (N.D. Cal. 1954). But cf.
Bible v. Chevron Oil Co., 308 F. Supp. 312, 316 (E.D. La. 1969). See generally Currie,
The Choice Among State Laws in Maritime Death Cases, 21 VAND. L. REV. 297 (1968).
8 Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 HARv.
L. REV. 1084, 1085 (1964). The idea is that any national action should be regarded as
interstitial and "as a backstop for state action." H. HART, JR. & H. WECHSLER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 435 (1953) [hereinafter cited as HART &
WECHSLER].
In Younger v. Harris, 39 U.S.L.W. 4201 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971) (No. 2) the Supreme
Court reversed a three judge court's determination that a state criminal statute was un-
constitutional. In holding that the three judge court should have abstained from its hold-
ing, the Court admonished the lower court's declaration as "a violation of the national
policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except
under special circumstances .... ." id. at 4202. Discussing "our federalism," Mr. Justice
Black used the following language:
The concept does not mean blind deference to 'States Rights' any more
than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our
National Government and its courts. The Framers rejected both these
courses. What the concept does represent is a system in which there is a
sensitivity to the legitimate interest of both State and National Govern-
ments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be
to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always en-
deavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate
activities of the States. Id. at 4203.
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interested and responsive.! With this initiative for framing federal policy
primarily vested in the Congress, the historic adjustment of the state-
national relationship by Erie R. R. v. Tompkins" left little doubt that
the federal courts have limited lawmaking competence in this area.
Nevertheless, an examination of the cases decided since Erie involving
issues of federal competence to formulate decisional rules makes it
equally clear that the extent of this authority is not restricted simply
' Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," 1960 SUP. CT.
REV. 158, 160. The question of the necessity of a uniform body of law establishing the
rights and liabilities of all parties involved in aircraft accidents has been before Congress
since 1968. The objective of the first bill introduced into the Senate-the "Holtzoff Bill"
-was to establish exclusive federal jurisdiction over "any civil action for damages . . .
arising out of the operation of aircraft in interstate, or foreign air commerce." S. 3305,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1968). The approach would have established a substantive
body of federal law of tort and wrongful death based on the common law "as. • inter-
preted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." Id. The
bill was strongly criticized, however, because the definition of "aircraft" would have
applied not only to interstate air carriers, but also to private aircraft that crossed a state
line during flight. Further criticism was directed at a narrow definition of "interstate
commerce," which would have excluded air carriers that operated only intrastate. Hear-
ings on S. 3305 & S. 3306 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 28 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings on S. 3305 & 3306]. As a result, a companion bill-S. 3306-patterned after
the Death on the High Seas Act, was introduced. The "Admiralty Bill" provided for ex-
clusive federal jurisdiction over "any action for damages for injury ... or death claimed
to be caused by negligent, tortious, or wrongful act or omission arising out of, or in the
course of, aviation activity or space activity." S. 3306, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. § 1 (1968).
The provisions created a body of federal law "ascertained by decisions of courts of com-
petent jurisdiction in cases or controversies, subject to any applicable federal statutes or
treaties" governing "all civil legal relations of persons and property in, and all acts,
transactions matters and things ... arising out of, or in the course of, aviation or space
activity . . . exclusive of the laws . . . of the several States . . . and the admiralty or
maritime law heretofore applicable." S. 3306, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1968). The bill
came under heavy attack, however, again because the coverage was so broad. Hearings
on S. 3305 & 3306 at 69 (statement of Walter H. Bechman, Jr.). The modified bill
introduced into the 91st Congress confered exclusive federal jurisdiction only on "those
aircraft crashes which ordinarily involve substantial numbers of people and suits in mul-
tiple courts," but retained the provisions for a uniform body of federal law that would
apply to all aviation transactions. Hearings on S. 961 Before the Subcomm. on Improve-
ment in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 2, at 200 (1969). See generally, Tydings, Air Crash Litigation: A Judicial Problem
and a Congressional Solution, 18 AM. U. L. REV. 299 (1969). During the hearings, there
was little opposition to a uniform substantive law, but the possibility of a uniform federal
substantive law created serious, ultimately fatal, opposition. The argument turned on
considerations such as "traditionally our tort system has recognized the efficacy and wis-
dom of flexibility in legal reform created by our federalism. The various independent
jurisdictions are free to shape and mold their jurisprudence in accordance with their
view of the better rule of law." Sanders, The Tydings Bill, Symposium on Air Accident
Investigation and Litigation, 36 J. AIR L. & CoM. 550 (1970); Hearings on Aircraft
Crash Liability Before the Subcomm. on Improvement in Judicial Machinery of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 240-1 (1969). S. 961 died in com-
mittee when the 91st Congress expired. With the defeat of The Hon. J. Tydings, the
staunch and sometimes sole supporter of unification, in his contest for the United States
Senate, it is almost unrealistic to suppose that unification will be forthcoming from the
Congress. For commentary on the proposed legislation, see Note, Aircraft Crash Litiga-
tion, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1052 (1970); Comment, Federal Courts-Proposed Air-
craft Crash Litigation Legislation 35 Mo. L. REv. 215 (1970).
1 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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to create a vacuum of governmental power; the boundaries remain an
open question." Thus, categorical adherence by the federal courts to a
conclusive "political logic of federalism,"' 2 without futher strict analysis,
can, and often does, lead to errors in perspective and approach-more
out of preference to dogma than reason." This problem has been par-
ticularly acute in actions brought in federal courts for recovery for the
wrongful death of persons killed in aviation and the maritime industry.
1. Aviation
The development of the safe operation of aircraft is an expressed ob-
jective of federal policy;" yet wrongful death litigants find an unhappy
analogy to the common law-the federal interest dies with the deceased.
Nevertheless, the vast majority of commercial aviation transactions are
interstate, even international. The subject matter belongs to no particular
n Notwithstanding the statement of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Erie that "there is no
federal general common law," federal courts have formulated applicable rules of law
without guidance from legislation in a number of areas. See, e.g., Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) (It is not uncommon for federal courts to
fashion federal law where federal rights are concerned); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (Government commercial paper); Hinderlider v.
LaPlata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938) (apportionment of the
waters of an interstate stream); United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir.
1966) (government contracts). See generally 1A J. MooRE, FED. PRACTICE 55 .318-.327
(1965); Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 383, 417 (1964). Cf. Keeffe, In Praise of Joseph Story, Swift v. Tyson
and "The" True National Common Law, 18 AM. U.L. REV. 316 (1969).
12 Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 545
(1954). Cf. HART & WECHSLER 706-08.
11 See Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," 1960 Sup. CT.
REV. 158, 220.
1449 U.S.C. §§ 1655(c), 1657(f)(g) (1966), amending 49 U.S.C. 5 1346 (1958):
The Administrator is empowered and directed to encourage and foster the
development of civil aeronautics and air commerce in the United States and
abroad.
See also Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (concurring
opinion):
Congress has recognized the national responsibility for regulating air
commerce. Federal control is intensive and exclusive. Planes do not wander
about in the sky like vagrant clouds. They move only by federal permis-
sion, subject to federal inspection, in the hands of federally certified per-
sonnel and under an intricate system of federal commands. The moment
a ship taxis onto a runway it is caught up in an elaborate and detailed
system of controls. It takes off only by instruction from the control tower,
it travels on prescribed beams, it may be diverted from its intended landing,
and it obeys signals and orders. Its privileges, rights and protection, so far
as transit is concerned, it owes to the federal government alone and not to
any state government.
Cf. Braniff Airways v. Nebraska Board, 347 U.S. 590, 596 (1954) (federal acts bot-
tomed on the commerce power of Congress); Allegheny Airlines v. Cedarhurst, 132
F. Supp. 871, 874-80 (E.D.N.Y. 1955) (national defense). For a historical discussion
see Lindsey, The Legislative Development of Civil Aviation 1938-1958, 28 J. Am L. &
CoM. 18 (1961); Ballard, Federal Regulation of Aviation, 60 HARV. L. REV. 1235
(1947).
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state, nor is any one state vested with its development.' Application of
state law, however, results in the enigma that both the standard and
extent of an air carrier's liability change each time it flies over a state
line, an event likely to occur several times during any particular flight
and according to reasons frequently unknown before take-off. The
states' interest in applying these laws has not been seriously challenged"'
even though the attendant confusion has been substantial, the question
of governing law productive of litigation, and the legal system's re-
sponse uncertain. For example, because potential liability cannot be
determined with any accuracy, insurance premiums must be com-
puted on the assumption of the most unfavorable circumstances, involv-
ing the highest cost for the greatest risk.'8 The lack of a uniform law
also creates administrative difficulties in determining the conduct of
operations and expenses, imposed not by business factors but by legis-
lation that varies from state to state."
"Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (concurring opinion);
see Hearings on H.R. 14,465 Before the Subcomm. on Avi. of the Senate Commerce
Comm., 91st Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. (1969-70).
"In Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967), the court held
an airline liable for wrongful death resulting from the disappearance of an aircraft at
sea. The court found liability despite substantial proof by the airline that all systems
were proper and operative on take-off. Cf. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34,
172 N.E.2d 526, 527, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961):
An air traveler from New York may in a flight of a few hours duration
pass through several . . . commonwealths. His plane may meet with dis-
aster in a state he never intended to cross but into which the plane has
flown because of bad weather or other unexpected developments, or an
airplane's catastrophic descent may begin in one state and end in another.
The place of the injury becomes entirely fortuitous.
See generally Note, 18 VAND. L. REV. 1632 (1965).
7 Compare Moody v. McDaniel, 190 F. Supp. 24 (N.D. Miss. 1960) with Fitzgerald
v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956) and Rosdail v.
Western Aviation, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 681 (D. Colo. 1969). Cf. Rogers v. Ray Gardner
Flying Service, Inc., 435 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3437
(U.S. April 13, 1971) (No. 1318); Lockwood v. Astronautics Flying Club, Inc., 437
F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1971).
18 See the findings of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences of the
United States Senate that "aviation safety has not improved much over the past 17
years." S. REP. No. 957, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 17 (1968). A classic example of the
insurance problems facing the aviation industry as a result of the application of state
law is the recently decided case of Traill v. Felder, No. A-41-69 (D. Alaska, Dec. 10,
1970). In Traill an insurance company filed a petition for a declaratory judgment alleging
that it had no obligation to defend its insured in suits pending as a result of an air crash
on the ground that the aircraft had on board at the time of the crash an excess number
of passengers, which was over the declared maximum stated in the certificates of insur-
ances issued to the owner of the aircraft. The district court, applying Alaska law, denied
the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and held that the exclusion clause in the
certificate was "void and unenforceable insofar as they attempt to deny payment of any
final judgment recovered against the carrier ...for bodily injuries to or death of any
persons resulting from [negligence]." Id. at 11. See generally, Hardman, Aircraft Pas-
senger Accident Law: a Reappraisal, 1961 INs. L.J. 688, 697. See also Davis, ". . . to
inform you that our aviation policy does not afford coverage . . ." 36 J. AIR. L. &
COM. 246 (1970).
"Compare 3 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 41-1-3 (1963), as amended, (Perm. Cum. Supp.
1967) with IOWA CODE ANN. § 611.20 (1950).
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If the public interest in air safety also means a public interest in avia-
tion generally,"° the application of state death laws, with resulting un-
certainty concerning the law by which liability is to be determined, is
a hindrance and hence directly opposed to the public interest. A crash
of a modem aircraft, for example, generally causes the death of all
aboard, usually a substantial number of people, all from different states."'
The survivors or representatives of each estate may bring an action for
wrongful death in any one of a number of jurisdictions,"2 and since liabil-
ity varies according to the particular state law under which the case is
tried, recovery may produce costly duplication of discovery, attorney's
fees and other litigation costs, not to mention the increased pressure on
judicial dockets." Further, varied use of theories of recovery," the bur-
2" See Hardman, supra note 18 at 694.
21 As of January, 1971, air carrier operations resulted in 145 deaths for the calendar
year 1970. In general aviation 4,927 accidents involved 1,270 deaths. NTSB Safety Infor-
mation Release No. SB 71-1 (Jan. 11, 1971). In 1969 the passenger fatality rate per 100
million passenger-miles was 0.132. BUREAU OF AVIATION SAFETY, NATIONAL TRANSPOR-
TATION SAFETY BOARD, A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT DATA U.S.
CIVIL AVIATION 1969, at 22-2 (1970). For statistics of fatalities from 1958-65, see CAB,
STATISTICAL REVIEW OF U.S. AIR CARRIER AND GENERAL AVIATION ACCIDENTS DURING
CALENDAR YEAR 1958, at 1 (1959); CAB, STATISTICAL REVIEW OF N.S. AIR CARRIER
ACCIDENTS DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1959, at 10 (1961); CAB, STATISTICAL REVIEW AND
RESUME OF ACCIDENTS OF U.S. AIR CARRIERS DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1960, at 7 (1963);
CAB, STATISTICAL REVIEW AND RESUME OF ACCIDENTS OF U.S. AIR CARRIERS DURING
CALENDAR YEAR 1961, at 7 (1963); CAB, STATISTICAL REVIEW AND RESUME OF U.S.
Am CARRIER ACCIDENTS DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1962, at 7 (1964); CAB, STATISTICAL
REVIEW AND RESUME OF U.S. AIR CARRIER ACCIDENTS DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1963, at
7 (1964); CAB, STATISTICAL REVIEW AND RESUME OF U.S. AIR CARRIER ACCIDENTS
DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1963, at 7 (1965); CAB, STATISTICAL REVIEW AND RESUME OF
U.S. AIR CARRIER ACCIDENTS DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1964, at 7 (1966); CAB, STA-
TISTICAL REVIEW AND RESUME OF U.S. AIR CARRIER ACCIDENTS DURING CALENDAR YEAR
1965, at 7 (1969).
22 Typically, the defendants in air crash litigation include the airlines, manufactures
of the aircraft and component parts, the United States under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1964), and the individual pilots and crew members or their
estates. Obviously, each of these parties will have a residence or a principal place of busi-
ness in a state other than that where incorporated or where the accident occurred. See
Tydings, supra note 9 at 299-300; Comment, 35 Mo. L. REV. 215 (1970). Cf. Dostal,
Aviation Law Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 24 FED. B.J. 165, 185-86 (1964).
20 The 1960 crash into Boston Harbor, killing 62 of the 72 persons on board the air-
craft, resulted in 114 law suits in the Massachusetts federal court, 48 suits in the Penn-
sylvania federal court, in addition to numerous suits filed in the various state courts. The
lawsuits produced three appeals and one petition to the United States Supreme Court,
and not all of the suits have been determined after almost ten years from the date of
filing. At least 64 cases are pending in the federal district courts in New York, Missouri,
and North Carolina as a result of the Hendersonville disaster. See Hearings on S. 961
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt.
w, 264 (1969). Potentially, each of these 64 cases involve a separate trial although the
issues are basically the same. The duplication has been alleviated somewhat by the
creation of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation which has been given the power
to transfer cases involving the same questions of fact to a single district for consolidated
pre-trial proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1964). The usefulness of this procedure is
limited, however, since the transfer is for pre-trial proceedings only. See generally Report
of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation Before the Subcomm. on Improvements
in Judicial Machinery, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 266 (1969). For a criticism of the operation
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den of proof,' affirmative defenses," and doctrines that ease or restrict
all of these," present the anomolous possibility that one jurisdiction
might not afford recovery, although another clearly would, while still
another might limit the amount recoverable," even though "fault"9 re-
mains constant.
Finally, because of the peculiarly interstate character of air travel, a
critical decision must be made initially about the proper resolution of
of the machinery of the panel once a case is transferred, see McElhaney, A Plea for
Preservation of the "Worms Eye View" in Multidistrict Litigation, 37 J. Am L. & COM.
infra at 49 (1971). Cf. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19
Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942); Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of
the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1957).
24 Compare Margosian v. United States Aircraft, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y.
1955) (applying New York law) (strict liability) with Arrow Aviation, Inc. v. Moore,
266 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1959) (applying Missouri law) (negligence) and Johnson v.
Eastern Air Lines, 177 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1949) (applying S.C. law) (presumption of
negligence). For a proposal of a system of absolute liability, see Note, Domestic Com-
merical Aircraft Tort Litigation: A Proposal for Absolute Liability of the Carriers, 23
STAN. L. REV. 569 (1971).
22 Compare Gatenby v. Altoona Aviation Corp., 407 F.2d 443, 446 (3rd Cir. 1968)
(applying Pennsylvania law) (high degree of care) with Upper Valley Aviation, Inc. v.
Fryer, 392 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (violation of Federal Aviation regulations
possible proof of negligence). Cf. Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F.2d 602 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). See generally Hardman, Aircraft Passenger
Accident Law: A Reappraisal, 1961 INS. L.J. 688, 695.
21 Compare Lopez v. Resort Airlines, Inc., 18 F.R.D. 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) with
Swanson v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
2"See Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 945 (1952). In Lobel the accident causing injury occurred in Indiana. The
plaintiffs filed a petition in a New York federal court alleging negligence. Indiana law
required the rebuttable presumption application of res ipsa loquitur, and the district
court charged the jury on the Indiana presumption. The Second Circuit reversed, holding
that since New York considered the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to be procedural, the
inference concept, rather than the presumption, must be charged. See generally W.
PRoSsER, TORTS 215-239 (3rd ed. 1964); Kreindler, Using Res Ipsa Loquitur in Air-
plane Crash cases, 64 CASE & CoM. 3 (Nov.-Dec. 1959); Note, The Liability of Air-
lines for Injuries to Passengers, 31 S. CAL. L. REV. 319 (1958).
28 Compare Bright's Estate v. Western Airlines, 104 Cal. App. 2d 827, 232 P.2d 523
(1951) with Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Northwest Airlines Inc., 94 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. Wis.
1950). Nine jurisdictions limit the amount recoverable in a wrongful death action.
Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1-3 (1963) ($25,000); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-1903 (1967 Supp.) ($35,000); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAws, ch. 229, § 2 (1967
Supp. 3 ($50,000); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (1967 Supp.) ($35,000); New
Hampshire, NEw HAMP. REV. STAT. § 556.13 (1955); Missouri, § 537.090 R.S. Mo.
1967 Supp. ($50,000); Wisconsin, WIs. STAT. § 895.04 ($23,500); Virginia, VA. CODE
ANN. § 8-636 (1968 Supp.) ($25,000); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. S 55-7-6 (1967)
($10,000 to estate, $100,000 to dependent survivors).
29 An aviation accident prompts a federal investigation team, resulting in a report
issued by the National Transportation Safety Board. The report characteristically con-
tains a conclusion of the probable cause of the accident, although such conclusions are
not admissible for determining liability. See Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1441(e)
(1964); Fed. Aviation Reg., pt. 485, 14 C.F.R. § 435.4 (1969). See also Universal Air-
lines, Inc. v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 188 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1951). A plaintiff may
utilize the investigation machinery as a source for theories to develop at trial, but he
must offer other evidence to prove his case. See Speiser, Airline Passenger Death Cases,
8 AM. Jum. Trials § 108, 110 & 111 (1965). Finally, an investigation report of the
NTSB investigation team can cost upwards to $1000 to reproduce, Speiser, id. S 10.
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conflict of laws. The question is difficult. Since the location of an avia-
tion accident is fortuitous in most cases,"0 the source of the substantive
law to be applied is intertwined with modern choice of law analysis.
In multistate wrongful death litigation, where the states clearly have
the power to adopt their own rules affecting the appropriate state law
governing the rules of decision, "1 the traditional rule that the law of the
place of the accident governs all substantive phases of recovery has been
rapidly declining. " Judicial adoption of new methods for analyizing
choice of law problems has been applauded as realistically evaluating
factors according to their relative importance with respect to the par-
ticular issue to be decided.' Not all courts, however, have accepted the
arguments advanced against the traditional rule," and a critical exami-
nation of the cases shows that slow reform and concurrent confusion
among the state courts often lead to the undesirable result that any
particular state law governing recovery cannot be determined in advance
of actual litigation.' Even among those courts concerned with selecting
particular rules of law rather than with locating a state's legal system
' See, e.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y. 2d 34, 172 N.E. 2d 526, 211
N.Y.S. 2d 133 (1961); Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 97, 98-9 (S.D.
N.Y. 1960).
8' Meshkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 806, (1957).
' At least 13 states, including the District of Columbia, have rejected the lex delicti
method. Alaska: Armstrong v. Armstrong, 358 P.2d 34 (Sup. Ct. 1969); California:.
Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (Sup. Ct. 1967), see also Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Workmen's Compensation App. Bd., 64 Cal. Rptr. 440, 434 P.2d 992, (Sup. Ct.
1968) (workmen's compensation); District of Columbia: Emmert v. United States, 300
F. Supp. 45 (D.D.C. 1969); Iowa: Conradi v. Boone, 316 F. Supp. 918 (D.C. Iowa
1969); Fuerste v. Bemis, 257 Iowa 547, 133 N.W. 2d 907 (1968); Minnesota: Balts v.
Balts, 273 Minn. 417, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141
N.W.2d 526 (1966); New Jersey: Van Dyke v. Bolves, 258 A.2d 372, 107 N.J. Super.
383 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1969); New Hampshire: Dow v. Larrabee, 107 N.H. 70, 217 A.2d
506 (1966); New York: Long v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213
N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965); Dym v. Gorden, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d
792 (1965); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279; 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963); Oregon: Defoor v. Lematta, 437 P.2d 107 (Ore. 1967); Pennsylvania: Midland-
Ross Corp. v. Sunbeam Equip. Corp., 316 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Griffith v.
United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Rhode Island: Brown v. Church
of Holy Name of Jesus, 252 A.2d 176 (R.I. 1969); Wisconsin: Conklin v. Horner, 157
N.W.2d 579 (Wis. 1968); see Wessling v. Paris, '417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967). But cf.
Doss v. Apache Powder Co., 430 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1970) (applying Texas law);
Marmon v. Mustang Avi. Inc., 416 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), aff'd. 430 S.W.2d
182 (Tex. 1968).
33 See, e.g., Cavers, Cheatham, Currie & Ehrenzweig, Comments on Babcock v. Jack-
son, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1963);
Wolens, A Thaw in the Reign of Lex Loci Delicti, 32 J. AIR. L. & COM. 408 (1966).
'See, e.g., Marmon v. Mustang Avi. Inc., 416 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967),
aff'd 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968). Cf. Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill. 2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593
(Ill. 1970).
" Compare Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963) with Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1965)
and Kell v. Henderson, 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (Sup. Ct. 1966). See
also Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966).
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governing all substantive issues, there is little agreement either pertaining
to the methods to be followed"6 or the results to be derived from a given
method, once adopted. "
In cases filed in state courts the magnitude of these problems is not
as great as first appears. After all, in conflict determinations the state
courts always have an escape by applying their own law if a rational
choice between conflicting laws cannot be made." Choice of law analysis
by the federal courts applying state law is a different matter. In Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.," the Supreme Court held that a federal
diversity court enforcing state-created rights must make an initial refer-
ence to the entire law of the state where the federal court is located and
apply the choice of law rules according to that state's law."' Klaxon has
been criticized, however, for creating needless uncertainty and promoting
forum shopping among the federal courts as well as severely, and perhaps
unnecessarily, limiting a significant contribution that could be made from
disinterested federal judges in resolving multistate conflicts."1 For ex-
ample, when a federal court applying Erie sits only as a disinterested
forum with no law of its own to apply, adoption of modern choice of
law analysis compounds existing difficulty by propounding theories
that have nothing to do with the determination of liability; nor do
they have guaranteed acceptance by the state courts when presented
with the same question."
" Compare Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964) with
Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, Inc., 357 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
3 See, e.g., Williams v. Rawlings Truck Lines, Inc., 357 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
38 See B. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 754,
757-59 (1963); Currie, The Choice Among State Laws in Maritime Death Cases, 21
VAND. L. REV. 297, 308 (1968).
-313 U.S. 487 (1941). Cf. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
40 See also Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1166 (N.D. Ill. 1969);
Dunn v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 271 F. Supp. 662 (D. Del. 1967); Wright v. American
Flyers Airline Corp., 263 F. Supp. 865 (D.S.C. 1967). But see Deveny v. Rheem Mfg.
Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963).
41 See HART & WECHSLER 634-36.
4 An example of the possible complications is Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1
(1962). In an action for wrongful death brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1346 (1964), the Supreme Court applied the law of Oklahoma as the "place
where the act or ommission occurred," although the fatal crash had occurred in Mis-
souri during a scheduled Oklahoma-New York flight. The Court held that the Act
referred to the entire body of law, including the conflicts of law rule, of the place where
the act or ommission occurred as the basis for determining the liability of the Govern-
ment. Missouri limited recovery for wrongful death, but Oklahoma did not. Compare
§ 537.090 R.S. Mo. 1967 Supp. with OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1053 (1961). Although inti-
mating that Oklahoma need not necessarily follow the traditional lex loci rule, the
Court found that in fact it did, which led, via the Oklahoma conflict of laws rule, to
the application of the Missouri limitation. If, however, the action were brought in a New
York court which found that Oklahoma's interest was predominant, the court would
then have to decide whether Oklahoma's interest should be served by applying the
domestic law or the conflict of laws rule. If the former approach were adopted, the
court would be saying that it knew better what was in Oklahoma's best interest than did
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The unsatisfactory state of the law in this area is not simply a product
of the uncertainty that accompanies new theory. The problem is in-
herent in the nature of the approach rather than in the application, and
is reflective of lack of normative criteria. What is needed in these cases
is not only an analysis of competing state interests, but also an approach
that reveals all interests involved, both state and federal, and then a bal-
ancing process without reference to euphemistic dangers affecting the
balance of state-national relationships, inherent in the absence of spe-
cific congressional guidelines. Identification of national policy should be
made completely independent of the states' interests in applying their
law. 3 If this analysis reveals a problem in which the federal government
has concern, and in which the application of state law would seriously
interfere with that concern, federal law should be applied." Conversely,
if analysis does not reveal a national interest, and if the state's interest
in applying its law is substantial, Erie dictates that state law should be
applied. Thus analyzed, there is no constitutional objection to a rational
reworking, on policy grounds, of this aspect of "federalism."' Nor is
there even a need, in this area at least, for a reallocation of power be-
tween the federal and state courts in order to make a proper determina-
tion of choice of law rules."
In aviation death litigation the federal courts nevertheless continue
systematically to become tangled in webs of "delicate problem[s] of
federal-state relations". and consequently sacrifice stability and consist-
ency for a meaningless "absense of a clear indication of the intent of
Congress" 8 in an area which cannot be rationally cognizable under the
laws of any state.
2. Maritime
To further complicate matters, aviation accidents haphazardly occur
Oklahoma. See Hailer, Death in the Air: Federal Regulation of Tort Liability a Must,
54 A.B.A.J. 382 (1968).
43See Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961); South-
eastern Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd, 209 Tenn. 639, 355 S.W.2d 436 (1962), app. dissm'd, 371
U.S. 21 (1962). Contra, Rosdail v. Western Aviation, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 681 (D. Colo.
1969); Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Service, Inc., 435 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. April 13, 1971) (No. 1318).
4' Cf. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970); Southern Pac. Co.
v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
"See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Katzenback v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (1964).
'The "ideal" supreme federal common law of choice of law would require over-
ruling Klaxon, thus encountering difficult problems under the full faith and credit
clause. See Horowitz, Toward a Federal Common Law of Choice of Law, 14 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1191, 1194 (1967). Cf. Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a Limitation on State
Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 84 HARV. L. REV. 806 (1971).
4' Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Service, Inc., 435 F.2d 1389, 1395 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. April 13, 1971) (No. 1318).
48 Id.
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in navigable waters. The constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction
to the federal courts, 9 the original purpose and sole modem justification
for which is the promotion and protection of the maritime industry,"9 has
been extended to include aviation accidents. The result is an application
of an entirely separate system of jurisprudence, inappropriate to the
aviation industry, dependent upon the fortuitous possibility of the crash
occurring upon water rather than upon land. Until recently, even when
the admiralty jurisdiction has been invoked, the governing substantive
law has depended upon a further critical, and equally fortuitous, dis-
tinction whether the accident occurred upon the high seas or within
state waters." Accidents causing death occurring beyond a state's three-
mile limit are governed by the Death on the High Seas Act," which pro-
vides that certain classes of dependent survivors have a remedy for a
"maritime tort" resulting in death when caused by the "wrongful act,
neglect or default" of another. By express terms of the statute, however,
the DOHSA has no application for injuries resulting in death occurring
within a state's territorial waters. Thus, even where potentially applica-
ble, the general maritime law has not been free from the complications
resulting from the assertion of state interest; federal courts sitting in ad-
miralty have applied state wrongful death statutes"' together with all the
attendent confusion as if the accident occurred on land and the added
definitional problems inherent in extending, or not extending, the ad-
miralty jurisdiction." However, notwithstanding arguments to the con-
trary,"' the distinction between the maritime law and the law applicable
in other wrongful death litigation was superficial, if not unreal, and, in
"' U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 cI. 1.
10 Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 259,
280 (1950); Pelaez, Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction-The Last Barrier, 7 DUQUESNE L. REV.
1, 42 (1968).
" See, e.g., D'Aleman v. Pan Am. World Airways, 259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958); Noel
v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907
(1957). See generally Moore & Palaez, Admiralty Jurisdiction-The Sky's the Limit, 33
J. AIR L. & COM. 3 (1967). See also Comment, Aviation Challenges Admiralty Juris-
diction: Sink or Swim in the Sea of Uncertainty, 35 J. AIR. L. & CoM. 619 (1969);
Comment, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Airplanes and Wrongful Death in Territorial Waters,
64 COLUM. L. REV. 1084 (1964).
" Compare Scott v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 979 (1968) with Sierra v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 519
(D.P.R. 1952). For a general discussion, see Comment, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 905 (1955).
'346 U.S.C. §5 761-67 (1964).
"It is interesting to note that a tort is a "mental construction, [and] doesn't 'take
place' anywhere." Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 COLUM.
L. REV. 259, 264 (1950). See Thomson v. Chesapeake Yacht Club, Inc., 255 F. Supp.
555 (D. Md. 1965).
"3See, e.g., The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
5See generally 7A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 55 .325-.330 (2d ed. 1953).
"See The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 608 (1959) (dissenting opinion). Cf.
Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
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the final analysis, solely dependent on whether the state in question
granted recovery.5" Ultimately, the interests protected were those of the
states, and the judicial creation of federal law interferring with these
interests was shunned because of the possibility of undercutting the
constraints of federalism. 9
Last Term, however, in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.," the
Supreme Court destroyed this entire edifice by holding that federal law
provides a right to recover for death caused by the violation of maritime
duties occurring within a state's territorial waters, notwithstanding the
terms of state wrongful death statutes or the silence of Congress. By
overruling The Harrisburg,"' the case establishing the rule that the mari-
time law provides no such action apart from statute, as an "unjustifiable
anomaly" that should no longer be regarded as acceptable law,"2 the
Court made evident that the benefits provided by local solution no longer
outweigh the need for a federal rule.' The reasons for this declaration of
supremacy of national policy over derogating state interests and the
possible implications for the aviation industry are the subjects of the
present inquiry.
B. Analytical Bases-Problems of Teapots
The objective of this article is to demonstrate that no qualitative dif-
ference exists between the federal interest in promoting the shipping in-
dustry and the federal interest in aviation. The absence of congressional
authorization in vindication of this federal concern, therefore, should
be inoperative to deny the power to the federal courts to formulate
rules of decision in aviation litigation. These courts should have the
same range of remedial authority as possessed by the state courts within
their spheres of competence or by the federal courts sitting in admiralty.
In this regard, the historical distinctions that have been attributed to the
jurisdictional grants to the federal courts in maritime and aviation
8 Compare The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959) with Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc., 409 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1969) rev'd 398 U.S. 375 (1970). Cf. Hess v.
Union Carbide Corp., 361 U.S. 340 (1960).
"In Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314, 332 (1960) Mr. Justice Harlan identified
the state's interest as ". . . providing for the victim's family, and preventing pauperism
by shifting what would otherwise be a public responsibility to those who committed the
wrong ... are matters intimately concerned with the state's interest in regulating familial
relationships." See also Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 83 (2d
Cir. 1961). See generally Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess,"
1960 Sup. CT. REV. 158.
60 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
61 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
62 398 U.S. 375, 378 (1970).
6 See also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 739 (1961) (reconciling con-
flicting state and federal interests is a process of federal law). See generally MacChesney,
Marine Insurance and the Substantive Admiralty Law: A Comment on the Wilburn Boat
Company Case, 57 MIcH. L. REV. 555 (1959).
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cases-uniformity" vis-A-vis unbiased protection against the provincial-
ism of the state courts"-are meaningless and even pernicious when
analyzing the problem in terms of congressional inaction. The question
ultimately to be decided is that if unformity of the law for the purposes
of planning interstate operations is important in commerce by water,
why is it not equally important in commerce by air? An answer in terms
of the division of powers between the federal and state governments,
made "obvious" by the constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction,
ignores the critical fact that when the Constitution was drafted virtually
all commerce was by water and most of that by sea."6 The peculiar nature
of the aviation accident, the international and interstate character of
airline operations, and the national interest in fostering the industry-
developments occurring long after the adoption of the Constitution-
suggest that problems involving aircraft should no more be left to the
application of diverse, ill-suited and inconsistent rules than in cases
involving the general maritime law.
In wrongful death cases, however, the above analysis is both difficult
and elusive because of the failure of Congress to formulate, and the
federal courts to identify, a national policy when faced with these situa-
tions. Nevertheless, the designation is critical because in deciding
whether rules of federal common law should be fashioned and applied,
the guiding principle should be that a significant conflict between a
federal policy and the use of state law must first be shown specifically."
Absent congressional guidelines, it is awkward to suppose that the states
would be concerned with formulating remedial law for the breach of
federal duties.6 Thus, although policy may favor uniformity, since a
wrongful death action is a creature of the common law, a search for
standards often leads only to the state-created right." The initial ques-
tion to be determined, therefore, is under what circumstances will the
courts look to state law to determine the existence of interests which will
then control both the creation and classification of rights. Here, the
admiralty experience is particularly useful as having provided an es-
"4See Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Steward, 253 U.S. 149, 160 (1920). See generally
Wright, Uniformity in the Maritime Law of the United States, 73 U. PA. L. REV. 123,
232-34 (1925); Note, 50 Nw. U. L. REV. 677 (1955).
'Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938).
66 Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 456, 470 (1874). For a general dis-
cussion, see 7A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 .220 [1] p. 2302 (2d ed. 1953).
6
'Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68-69 (1966); Novak v.
General Electric Corp., 282 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D. Pa. 1967); United States v. Building &
Const. Trades Council, 271 F. Supp. 447 (E.D. Mo. 1966). Cf. Fed. Say. & Loan Ins.
Corp. v. Fielding, 309 F. Supp. 1146 (D. Nevada 1969).
6 See Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1512, 1523 (1969). Cf.
Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939).
"9See, e.g., Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Service, Inc., 435 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. April 13, 1971) (No. 1318).
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pecially severe test of the genuinely federal character of these rights."0
Once it has been determined that a federal test must classify the
rights of the parties over competing state interests, there remains the
difficult task of defining the standard. Two polar limits suggest them-
selves. As a maximum, it seems clear that the presence of federal com-
petence to declare decisional rules is insufficient to preempt equally
valid state law." On the other hand, the mere presence of state interest
should not, by itself, override the need to foster and encourage federal
policies." A second element must also be present: application of federal
decisional law requires a strong need for national uniformity. Thus, the
next area of consideration involves the extent of unification by a develop-
ment of federal common law rules.
If the answer to a choice between federal uniformity and state di-
versity favors federal uniformity, a question still remains whether parallel
remedies should continue to be available under state law. The remainder
of this article will discuss this consideration and suggest a rational means
of approach.
II. WRONGFUL DEATH-THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM AND THE
MARITIME SOLUTION
A. The State Interest
If the accepted means of resolving federal-state conflict is to be a
balancing process," careful identification of the state or national interest
is necessary. Since every state provides a remedy for wrongful death,"
a good starting point is an examination of the source of the state interest.
An obvious justification for applying state law is the advantage of local
solutions to local problems. Lacking the capacity to inform itself fully
about the complexities of a particular local need,' a federal court is
prudent and justified to give deference to state law.' State death statutes
often reflect local needs, an area in which a court's familiarity is likely
to be limited. Rules relating to family relationships, for example, have
"
0 Black, supra note 54; Note, The Expansion of Federal Question Jurisdiction to
Maritime Claims: A New Jurisdictional Theory, 66 HAtv. L. REV. 315 (1952).
7 See, e.g., Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33
(1956).
" Compare Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) with Guar-
anty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). Cf. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497
(1956).
" See Katzenback v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
4 W. PROSSER, TORTS § 121, at 924 (3rd ed. 1964).
15 It can be argued, for example, that a legislature is a better vehicle to gather infor-
mation which is often unavailable to the courts and which may be an essential part of
making a proper determination of a wrongful death case. Cf. Carmichael v. Southern
Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937).
7'See Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1512, 1516 (1969).
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traditionally been regarded as requiring local determination with which
the federal courts should not interfere." Moreover, it is frequently as-
serted that the states have an interest under their police power to protect
life and arrest the "dependency or pauperism of the survivors,"'" since in
most cases the claimants would be citizens of the state whose wrongful
death statute was to be applied."9
While these reasons may be enough to create a presumption in favor
of state law,8" they are not analytically self-evident. For years they did
not even exist, as the effect of tortious death rested solely upon statutory
foundations. 1 At common law a tort was considered a personal wrong;
an action in the courts for damages was a peaceful method of imposing
vengeance by the injured party. 2 All rights of action abated with the
death of either party, since the imposition of vengeance became im-
possible. Further, if the wrongful act was the cause of death, it was held
a felony, resulting in a merger of the civil action into a criminal prose-
cution. 3 These principles have a dubious historical basis;" nevertheless
the conclusion that wrongful death was not actionable at common law
became the uniform holding of the courts." A legislative remedy for
death caused by the "wrongful act, neglect, or default of another" was
provided, however, by the enactment of Lord Campbell's Act " in 1846.
Since the American courts continued to follow the common law rule
and denied recovery, state legislatures were forced to follow the lead
of Lord Campbell's Act if any financial support was to be provided to
the dependents of victims of wrongful conduct.
"See, e.g., The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 593 (1959); HART & WECHSLER
1013-18.
"
8 The City of Norwark, 55 Fed. 98, 108 (S.D. N.Y. 1893).
' See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133 (1961).
8 See Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1517-18 (1969).
" There is early authority, however, that denied the common law rule and granted
recovery notwithstanding the lack of a statute. See, e.g., Plummer v. Webb, 19 Fed. Cas.
894 (No. 11234) (D. Me. 1825); James v. Christy, 18 Mo. 162 (1853).
82See Finlay v. Chirney, 20 Q.B.D. 494, 502, 57 L.J.Q. 247 (1888).
11Higgins v. Butcher, Yelv. 89, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (1606).
84 Smedley, Wrongful Death-Great Base of the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L.
REV. 5 (1960). See also Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV.
1043, 1055 (1965).
85 See, e.g., Herzog v. Stern, 264 N.Y. 379, 191 N.E. 23 (1934); Grosso v. Delaware,
L. & W.R. Co., 50 N.J.L. 317, 13 A. 233, 235 (1888). Cf. Cortes v. Baltimore Insular
Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 371 (1932) (dicta).
88 The Fatal Accidents Act, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 §§ 1-6 (1846).
87Death legislation in the United States usually takes one of three forms: (1) a
wrongful death that creates a new cause of action in designated beneficiaries for their
pecurniary loss resulting from the death of another; (2) a survival statute that preserves
any claims the decedent had prior to death, but that does not create a new cause of
action; and (3) a revival statute, procedural in nature, that provides for the substitution
of the decedent's personal representative in any suit instituted by the deceased prior to
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As death statutes are designed to provide a remedy for a wrongful
act, it may be argued that the various enactments are merely remedial
legislation that should be liberally construed. The courts have held other-
wise.8" These statutes are considered to be more than remedies; they
establish a new cause of action. The important distinction is that the
provisions of the statutes, such as limitation periods and the designation
of beneficiaries, as well as the measure, elements and distribution of
recoverable damages are not merely procedural elements, but are part
of the statutory right.89 As a result, the "bag and baggage" of these
statutes creates particular difficulties in accommodating competing fed-
eral and state interests. On the one hand, it would be anomalous to
recognize the power of the state to create a right and then to ignore its
power to determine the conditions of recovery. On the other hand, the
very nature of a federal rule requires that if it is to apply, its remedies
should not vary from state to state.90 Yet, the natural consequence of
differing provisions of state statutes insures that the applicable sub-
stantive law will vary from state to state since the statutory text in-
corporating otherwise procedural elements governing recovery is ex-
ceedingly varied and diverse.'
The storm of confusion generated by this enigma is even greater when
the characteristic features of a uniform federal law condition the reme-
dy."2 The application of state wrongful death statutes in admiralty is
an example.
B. The Federal Interest and the Maritime Experience
1. Admiralty Jurisdiction
The Constitution of the United States provides that the judicial power
shall extend to "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.""2
Although this provision is at least an implied recognition of a general
system of maritime law existing at the time of the formation of this
country, it does not attempt to define the boundaries by which admiralty
jurisdiction can be determined. The test that has developed for deter-
death. See generally, W. PROSSER, TORTS § 105 (3rd ed. 1964); Note, Survival of Ac-
tions Brought under Federal Statutes, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 290 (1963).
"8See, e.g., McGinty v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 241 Ark. 533, 408 S.W.2d 891
(1966). But see Jones v. Pledger, 363 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
"
9The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
"'See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816); Note,
The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1529-31 (1969).
" Compare Glick v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 343 F.2d 839 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 891 (1965) with Jameson v. Memphis Transit Management Co., 381
F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1967) and Weiner v. United Air Lines, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.
Cal. 1964).
82 See Goett v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 U.S. 340, 348 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
92 U.S. CONST. art. III.
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mining the scope of admiralty tort jurisdiction' is simply whether the
occurence took place upon navigable waters." Jurisdiction was qualified
by the famous clause, "saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a com-
mon law remedy where the common law is competent to give it."" This
language has been held to encompass statutory modifications of the
common law not in conflict with the substantive maritime law." Thus,
under the savings clause, wrongful death actions can be heard both
in state courts and in federal courts through either admiralty or diversity
jurisdiction." Although the federal courts in admiralty have exclusive
competence over in rem actions not recognized at common law,9 under
the savings clause state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction
over in personam maritime claims."'
A remaining problem is whether a federal court is bound to refuse
jurisdiction under claims asserted under the Constitution and laws of
the United States,' in the absence of other jurisdictional bases. It would
seem inconsistent to hold that the rights arising from the maritime law
'Jurisdiction extends to actions sounding in contract as well as tort, but the juris-
dictional bases of the two are different. In contract actions maritime jurisdiction is con-
ceptual, while tort jurisdiction depends upon locality. Compare Kermarec v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 628 (1959) with State Industrial Comm'n v.
Nordenholh Corp., 259 U.S. 263, 271 (1922). See generally GILMORE & BLACK, AD-
MIRALTY 24-28 (1957), cf. Campbell v. H. Hackfield & Co., 125 Fed. 696 (9th Cir.
1903).
"1 7A J. MOORE, FED. PRACTICE 5 .325 [2] (1964). But see Chapman v. City of Groose
Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967) (for admiralty jurisdiction to exist, the tort
must be of a maritime nature and there must be some relationship between the wrong
and some maritime service, navigation, or commerce upon navigable waters).
"The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76-77 (1789). The judicial code
was revised in 1948 to read: "saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which
they are otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1958). The revisor's note states "[t]he
saving to suitors clause .. .was changed by substituting the words 'any other remedy to
which he is otherwise entitled' for the words 'the right of a common law remedy where
the common law is competent to give it.' The substituted language is simpler and more
expressive of the original intent of Congress and is in conformity with Rule 2 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure abolishing the distinction between law and equity."
See S. Rep. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1948). The Supreme Court has also treated
the revision as inconsequential. Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 560 n. 12
(1954). For a critical discussion, see Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction; Critique and Sug-
gestions 50 COLUM. L. REV. 259 (1950); Moore & Pelaez, Admiralty Jurisdiction-The
Sky's the Limit, 33 J. AIR. LAW & COM. 3 (1967).
"'Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 124 (1924).
"See Kuhn v. P. J. Carlin Const. Co., 274 N.Y. 118, 129-30, 8 N.E.2d 300, 304
(1937).
"1 Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556 (1954); The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 555, 570-71 (1866); The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 427 (1867). See
generally GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 37-39 (1957).
1"'Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 124 (1924); Siegelman v.
Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955).
10128 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958) provides that the district courts shall have original juris-
diction of all civil actions ". .. wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States."
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are federal rights and must therefore be followed by the state courts and
yet conclude that these rights do not arise under the Constitution or
laws of the United States. In addition, if the state courts refuse to hear
maritime cases, federal diversity courts would also be required to refuse
to hear such actions,"' and it can be argued that the savings clause
would be rendered useless." 3 This argument was rejected, however, in
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.' when the Supreme
Court concluded that maritime suits are within the jurisdiction of the
federal courts only if there exists some independent or pendent ground
of federal jurisdiction or if the admiralty jurisdiction is invoked. Thus,
if a claimant does not file his suit in admiralty, the petition will be dis-
missed unless diversity or some specific statutory grant" is made an in-
dependent ground of federal jurisdiction. However, the Court's holding
on the federal question issue has significance far beyond the context of
jurisdiction.
In Romero an injured Spanish seaman filed a petition in a federal
court against a Spanish shipowner' claiming unseaworthiness, °' negli-
gence compensable under the Jones Act, and maintenance and cure.'
In answering the contention that section 1331 dictated the taking of
federal question jurisdiction, the majority held that the grants of ad-
miralty and federal question jurisdiction were distinct, not overlapping,
and section 1331 did not extend to cases asserted under the general
maritime law since the admiralty jurisdiction already afforded the
proper forum." Limitations on the admiralty jurisdiction aside, if
Romero is read as excluding savings clause actions from section 1331
because of the existence of a separate ground of federal jurisdiction
over them, the door is clearly open for an interest-balancing approach
to problems of federal-state relations, completely independent of federal
'.See Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949).
'" One of the purposes of granting federal question jurisdiction to the federal courts
was to prevent the states from frustrating the rights derived from the federal govern-
ment. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 65 (1928).
14 358 U.S. 354 (1959). See also Paduane v. Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha,
221 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1955). For general discussions, see Currie, The Silver Oar and
All That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (1959); Kurland, The
Romero Case and Some Problems of Federal Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REV. 817 (1960).
10'See, e.g., The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
'" The plaintiff also made claims against three others, a New York corporation, the
alleged manager of the ship; a Delaware corporation, the stevedore; and another New
York corporation, a contractor.
"0 The maritime concept of unseaworthiness imposes upon a shipowner the absolute,
nondelegable duty to provide employed seamen with a ship, equipment and crew which
are reasonably fit for their intended use. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer Inc., 362 U.S. 539,
549-50 (1960); accord Mills v. Mitsubishi Shipping Co., 358 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1966).
'"See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
" See Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 265 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1959).
But see Mr. Justice Brennen's dissent in Romero, 358 U.S. at 398, cf. Doucette v. Vin-
cent, 194 F.2d 834 (lst Cir. 1952).
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statute. " ° All that is needed is the existence of the federal interest. The
Court, for example, has elsewhere said:
[A]lthough federal judicial power to deal with common-law problems
was cut down in the realm of liability or its absence governable by state
law, that power remained unimpaired for dealing independently, wher-
ever necessary or appropriate, with essentially federal matters, even
though Congress has not acted affirmatively about the specific question.
In this sense, therefore, there remains what may be termed, for want of
a better label, an area of "federal common law" or perhaps more ac-
curately "law of independent federal judicial decision," outside the con-
stitutional realm, untouched by the Erie decision. 1'
2. The Role of State Law in Maritime Jurisdiction
The problems created by judicial interpretation of "common law
remedy" have not been jurisdictional, but rather what law to apply once
jurisdiction is established. As an original matter, it might well be argued
that since maritime law is federal law, and supreme,"' whenever a mari-
time interest is involved, no matter how slight, it must displace a local
interest, no matter how significant."' The Supreme Court, however, has
not always applied maritime law to maritime cases; instead, state law
has often been applied, though the cases are admittedly within the ad-
miralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. The traditional power of the
state to preserve the lives of its citizens, or to grant relief in case of
death, has been protected more than the federal power over commercial
affairs--even maritime." ' But a system of state remedies is necessarily
incomplete, for no state has legislative jurisdiction to deal authoritative-
ly with problems of the general maritime law outside its territorial
waters."' The resulting administration of the savings clause could
threaten to bring about a dual system of substantive law involving the
same evils as Swift v. Tyson,"' but in reverse. Thus, the same logic of
federalism that prompted Erie also caused the Supreme Court to hold
"'0 See HART & WECHSLER, Xi.
.. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1947).
"'United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1947).
"'See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 739 (1961) (dicta).
"
4 See The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959). See also Compania Trans-
atlantic Espanola, S.A. v. Melendez Torres, 358 F.2d 209 (lst Cir. 1966); Curry v.
Fred Olsen Lines, 367 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 971 (1967);
Anthony v. International Paper Co., 289 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1961); Holley v. The Man-
fred Stansfield, 296 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1961); Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Service of
Texas, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 97 (W.D. La. 1964), afl'd in part, 412 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir.
1969); Hunter v. Dampsk A/S Flint, 279 F. Supp. 701 (E.D. Mich. 1967); Petition of
Marina Mercante Nicraguense, S.A., 248 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 364 F.2d
118 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967), rehearing denied, 386 U.S. 929
(1967); Vassallo v. Nederl-Amerik Stoomv Maats Holland, 162 Tex. 52, 344 S.W.2d
421 (1961).
15 Compare Lindstrom v. International Nay. Co., 117 Fed. 170, 173 (C.C.E.D.N.Y.
1902) with The Sagamore, 247 Fed. 743, 757 (1st Cir. 1917).
11641 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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that the state courts in savings clause cases must respect the same prin-
ciples of substantive obligation that the federal courts enforced under
the maritime law. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,"' the Court declared
unconstitutional a state workmen's compensation act insofar as it ap-
plied to harbor workers. While Mr. Justice McReynolds permitted state
legislation to "supplement" and, on occasion, even to alter or modify
the general maritime law,"8 he stated that regulation would be invalid
if it "contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress,
or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general
maritime law, or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of
that law in its international and interstate relations."'' . The savings
clause was regarded as remedial only in the sense of providing a means
of enforcing maritime law. Consequently, state law could never control
maritime transactions except when it was adopted to fill the "gaps" in the
general maritime law. 2
These "gaps" later came to be a serious inroad on the uniformity
dotrine, since the Supreme Court had earlier held that the maritime
law, like the common law, did not recognize liability for wrongful
death."' The subsequent use of state wrongful death statutes created an
indefensible situation. Ultimately, recovery turned on whether the injury
was fatal. If fatal, state law applied, as action could only lie under state
law; while if non-fatal, maritime law applied, since it afford a remedy
for tortious injury."' In cases involving injuries occurring within the
territorial waters of a state, the courts applied the maritime law, since
the scope and limitations of recovery excluded state law."' One signifi-
cance of this dichotomy lies in the common law rule of contributory
negligence as a complete bar to recovery, which is incorporated into
most state wrongful death acts." In maritime personal injury cases,
however, contributory negligence is superseded by the maritime rule
of comparative damages, which only mitigates recovery." The difference
in result is hardly consistent with equitable principles which demand
that conduct be adjudged equally in similar situations. '
The element of federalism is clearly present in these situations: the
scope of the maritime rule is determined by the jurisdiction that created
117244 U.S. 205 (1917).
"I Id. at 216.
119 Id.
"*Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 247 U.S. 233 (1921).
121 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
"'. See, e.g., Graham v. Lusi, Ltd., 206 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1953).
" Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
2 For a listing of the cases, see 25A C.J.S. DEATH § 46b at 710.
"'The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890), accord Ahlgren v. Red Star Towing Co.,
214 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1954).
"'See Kenney v. Trinidad Corp., 349 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1965).
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the right."' The concept demands that a federal court enforcing a state-
created right, though jurisdiction is in admiralty, must apply the right
as defined by the state, including any limitations attached. As is frequent-
ly the case, however, the federal interest is completely begged away. The
absence of a maritime remedy for wrongful death expresses no maritime
policy, only a judicial reluctance to contrive a remedy structure that has
traditionally been created by legislation.' 8 Insofar as the state's interest
is based on a policy of providing for incapacitated families 12 it is
hardly logical that the state's interest is minimal when only injury is
involved and maximal when death results. To deny the same uniformity
requirement for injury and death represents only that maritime law is
an entangled web of judicial precedents having little logical consistency
or practical sense.
3. The Maritime Solution: A Look at Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc.
Federal policy dictates that a seaman be indemnified for his injuries
caused by an unseaworthy vessel."' It is now clear that federal policy
is also concerned with his death. But the extent of the federal concern is
far less clear. In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 83 a unanimous
Court overruled The Harrisburg and almost one hundred years of pre-
cedent,' holding that an action for a longshoreman's death resulting
from an unseaworthy vessel is maintainable under the general maritime
law. This result is not very surprising, notwithstanding the diurnal na-
ture of The Harrisburg's rule. Since Jensen the need for maritime uni-
formity has been a principle resembling the preemptive, negative effect
2
'Note, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 150 (1959).
128 See The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 214 (1886) (it is the duty of the courts to
declare the law, not to make it).
1 2 Note 78 supra and accompanying text. Even this leads to inconsistancies. In Byrd
v. Napoleon Ave. Ferry Co., 125 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. La. 1954), aff'd, 227 F.2d 958
(5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 925 (1956), a man and his wife were disem-
barking from a ferry when their automobile fell into the Mississippi River, killing the
man. The widow filed suit under the Louisiana wrongful death statute for her husband's
death and under the maritime law for her injuries. The district court found the decedent
guilty of contributory negligence, a valid defense under Louisiana law for a wrongful
death action. She was able to recover for her injuries, however, since the husband's
negligence was imputed to her. Even if she had been found contributorily negligent, her
damages would have been mitigated, not barred, since the suit for her injuries was filed
under the general maritime law. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
I Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); The Chusan, 5 Fed. Cas.
680 (No. 2717) (C.C.D. Mass. 1843).
' 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
"'2Goett v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 U.S. 340 (1960); Hess v. United States, 361
U.S. 314 (1960); The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959); Levenson v. Deupree,
345 U.S. 648 (1953); The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886); cf. Insurance Co. v. Brame,
95 U.S. (5 Otto) 754 (1878); Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033
(K.B. 1808).
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of the commerce clause,"n thus requiring the application of federal law
in both the admiralty and state courts.' What is surprising, however,
is the basis of the Court's opinion. Although the need for a uniform
federal rule in maritime death cases undoubtedly had influence, uni-
formity was not controlling, nor was it balanced against a possible con-
flict with state interest. Instead, Mr. Justice Harlan specifically limited
the Court's holding to the overruling of The Harrisburg and the
anomalies perpetuated by that decision."5 Yet, even Mr. Justice Harlan
has maintained that "[t]he true inquiry . . . becomes one involving the
nature of the state interest . . . [and] the extent to which such interest
intrudes upon federal concerns.''. Do all elements of state death re-
covery "intrude" upon the maritime law? The uniformity principle has
never been considered a talisman."' The Court has consistently held
that the state's interest in providing recovery for the dependents of a
person killed by a tortious act outweighs any need for maritime uni-
formity.' What about the saving to suitors clause? Does the maritime
nature of tortious death deprive a state of its legitimate concern for its
residents or persons within its borders? Is there a difference between
permitting a state to supply a remedy and permitting it to change the
maritime standard of care? Since the general maritime law has never
recognized a death remedy apart from statute, what are the "procedural"
elements? May an admiralty court "borrow" from a state statute? Is
there a trial by jury? Limitations?
Although no abstract formula can resolve the problems of federalism
inherent in answering these questions, without a method of identifying
the particularity in each case where both a federal and state interest can
be found (the necessary result of a number of federal statutes... and an
even larger number of state statutes, each enacted with different ob-
jectives), the statement in Moragne that "the difficulties should be
slight"' is indefensible.
... Cf. 1 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 563-674 (1953).
" See, e.g., The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1875) (dictum).
" 398 U.S. at 379; cf. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines, 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963).
'Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314, 332 (1960) (dissenting opinion). But cf.
Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
1 7 See Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543
(1954).
""See, e.g., Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314, 331 (1960) (dissenting opinion);
Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Ju-
dicial Function, 26 U. Cm. L. REV. 9, 9-14 (1958).
"See, e.g., The Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1964); The
Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. S 688 (1964).
140 398 U.S. at 406.
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(a) "Saving to Suitors"
The jurisdiction of the federal admiralty courts is exclusive only when
an action is brought in rem."' Actions in personam may be brought in
admiralty, in a federal diversity court or in a state court, assuming the
jurisdictional requirements are met. A source of confusion is the possi-
bility that courts with concurrent jurisdiction may decide that the juris-
dictional grant also means that either the general maritime law or the
state common law is applicable to a maritime suit." If this rule were
followed, claimants asserting a wrongful death action in a state where
maritime theories of recovery are allowed under the state death act would
have a choice of applicable law by exercise of their perogative to file suit
in either admiralty or in a state court."2 The courts have enforced a
stronger rule of uniformity, however, and have held that if a case is mari-
time it must be governed by maritime principles, even if tried by a state
court or in a federal diversity court applying state law.'"
Although Mr. Justice Harlan did not address this issue in Moragne,
it would be inconsistent with the opinion to argue that the state courts
are allowed to "save" the remedy of wrongful death. The "gap" in the
maritime law created by the absence of a remedy for wrongful death is
filled by Moragne, thus precluding any application of the state remedy.
Even the inroad upon Jensen uniformity created by Western Fuel Co. v.
Garcia"2 could never be applied to maritime cases except where it was
adopted to fill the gap in the maritime law caused by The Harrisburg.
The determination of what law is to be applied therefore rests upon the
nature of the maritime law rather than the meaning of the savings clause.
So interpreted, the same principles will control a case tried on either
side of a federal court or in a state court. So long as the object of concern
is the protection and promotion of the maritime industry,' Moragne
should cause little difficulty.
141 Certain federal statutes create maritime causes of action which are exclusively
cognizable in admiralty, see, e.g., Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1964);
The Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-984 (1964).
" See Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674 (1893). But see Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346
U.S. 406 (1953).
" Compare Attlee v. Northwestern Union Packet Co., 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 389 (1875)
with The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890) (different rules of contributory negligence
applied in admiralty and state courts).
'" Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Swift & Co. v. Compania del
Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 (1950); DeLovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418 (No. 3776) (C.C.D.
Mass. 1815).
'-257 U.S. 233 (1921); Standard Dredging Co. v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 306 (1943).
After Jenson a "maritime but local" doctrine was developed that allowed state com-
pensation acts to apply in some cases. Thus, a carpenter working aboard a vessel which
was not completed but which was afloat could recover under state law. Grant Smith
Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922). However, a painter aboard a completed
vessel which was being repaired while afloat could not recover. Baizley Iron Works v.
Span, 281 U.S. 222 (1930); cf. Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960).




An early effect of concurrent jurisdiction was that the defenses of con-
tributory negligence and the fellow servant rule"7 would operate in the
state courts to bar maritime recovery."8 In admiralty, however, the op-
posite was true. The Supreme Court in The Osceola. held that a sea-
man could not maintain a claim in admiralty for negligence, although
he could seek recovery for maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness." °
By providing a negligence action for both fatal and nonfatal injuries of
a seaman, Congress, in the Jones Act,1"' obviated the inconsistency of
prohibiting compensatory damages for negligent injury under The Os-
ceola but allowing damages for negligent death by a state statute under
The Harrisburg. The Jones Act states that an injured seaman may sue
his employer under the Federal Employers' Liability Act," and "in case
of the death of any seaman, 1 1 his personal representative may maintain
the action. Congress also provided in the Death on the High Seas Act1 "
that certain classes of dependent survivors would have a remedy for a
maritime tort resulting in death caused by the "wrongful act, neglect or
default" of another if death occurred more than one marine league from
shore. Initially, this language was construed as encompassing only a
147See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).148 See, e.g., Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914); Belden v.
Chase, 150 U.S. 674 (1893).
149 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
110 The four propositions of the case are stated as follows:
(1) that the vessel and her owners are liable, in case a seaman falls sick, or is
wounded in the service of the ship, to the extent of his maintenance and cure, and for
his wages, at least so far as the voyage is continued;
(2) that the vessel and her owner are, both by English and American law, liable to
an indemnify the seaman for injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unsea-
worthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply and keep in order the proper appliances
appurtenant to the ship;
(3) that all the members of the crew, except perhaps the master, are, as between
themselves, fellow servants, and hence the injured seamen cannot recover for injuries
sustained through the negligence of another member of the crew beyond the expenses of
the maintenance and cure;
(4) that the seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity for the negligence of
the master, or any member of the crew, but is entitled to maintenance and cure, whether
the injuries were received by negligence or by accident.
11146 U.S.C. § 688 (1964):
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at
his election, maintain an action for damages at law ...and in such action all statutes
of the United States modifying or extending the common law right or remedy in cases
of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in case of death of any seaman
as a result of any such personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may
maintain an action for damages at law ... and in such actions all statutes of the United
States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway em-
ployees shall be applicable.
12245 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964).
15346 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
12446 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1964).
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negligence standard for recovery,1 but the courts have since held that
recovery for death caused by unseaworthiness is permitted under the
act.IS
Since the decision of Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki1' unseaworthiness
has evolved into a "species of liability without fault . . . neither limited
by conceptions of negligence nor contractual in nature... 8 In addition,
the remedy has been extended beyond those injured aboard ship to those
workers injured on the pier, who are considered seamen pro haec vice'
Under the rule of The Harrisburg, however, even a member of the ship's
crew who sustained fatal injuries within the territorial waters of a state
left survivors limited to a statutory remedy under the Jones Act, which,
by its terms, excludes unseaworthiness. This proposition was affirmed in
Lindgren v. United States; ' the Supreme Court held the Jones Act to be
the exclusive remedy for the wrongful death of a seaman, thereby pre-
cluding recovery under a state death statute. Lindgren rests on the prin-
ciple of negligence by preemption since Congress had acted. Mr. Justice
Sanford based his conclusions on the idea that an injured seaman had a
choice of electing between unseaworthiness and negligence, but that he
had to select one or the other. Thus, survivors of a seaman were denied
recovery for unseaworthiness, but, had he lived, relief under either
negligence or unseaworthiness would have been available.
Lindgren raised a great deal of controversy. In McAllister v. Mag-
nolia Petroleum Co. ' the Court seemingly discarded the case by holding
that the election under the Jones Act was not between negligence and
unseaworthiness, but rather an election of a forum. In Holland v. Steag,
Inc.,"' the Federal Employer's Liability Act... analogy was rejected be-
cause the doctrine of unseaworthiness was comprehensive and "lacking
the precise standards of care of the Safety Appliance Act." The refusal to
extend the election principle was based on the rationale that the ommis-
sion of "at his election" from the Jones Act indicated that Congress in-
tended to exclude "any recovery based on other grounds.1 .. The differ-
s' Bugden v. Trawler Cambridge, 319 Mass. 315, 65 N.E.2d 533 (1946).
15 See Chermesino v. Vessel Judity Lee Rose, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 36 (D. Mass.), aff'd
317 F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1963); Maryland v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 176 F. Supp. 664,
667 (D. Md. 1959) (dictum).
117 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
"18 Id. at 90.
"' But cf. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969) (The Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Worker Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1964), does
not extend recovery for injuries to longshoremen on piers permanently affixed to the
shore).
160281 U.S. 38 (1930).
161357 U.S. 221 (1958).
162 143 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1956).
16 See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
1 143 F. Supp. at 205.
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ences in concept illustrate the difficulty caused by state legislation. In
Lindgren the ommission had been utilized to preclude the use of state
legislation. In Holland it was used to prevent the expansion of the Jones
Act without reference to state legislation. Lindgren was affirmed in Gil-
lespie v. United States Steel Corp.," ' but since state legislation was in
question, the circular reasoning of Holland was avoided. Mr. Justice
Black reasoned that the absence of the phrase "at his election" was a
clear expression of legislative intent to exclude state death remedies for
unseaworthiness.
The difference in result between injury and death caused by Lindgren
and Gillespie was resolved in Moragne by granting a maritime remedy
for wrongful death, independent of state legislation. According to Mr.
Justice Harlan, there is a right of election under the Jones Act between
federal remedies. Thus, Gillespie and Lingren are not inconsistent nor,
at the same time, do they "disturb the seaman's right under the general
maritime law, existing alongside his Jones Act claim, '. which is beyond
the preclusive interpretation in those cases. Moreover, while Gillespie
and Lindgren are technically correct, Holland is simply wrong. In the
first place, clearly the exclusiveness of the remedy referred to in those
cases was intended only to distinguish the possible conflict between
federal and state remedies, not between the various federal remedies,
either statutory or under the maritime law. In the second place, since
state statutes were the only remedy available at the time of the passage
of the Jones Act, Congress could not possibly have intended that act to
be the only remedy ever to exist for wrongful death. 6 Thus, arguably,
Lindgren and Gillespie misdescribed the problem, even though the cor-
rect result is reached by recognizing the danger of permitting state law
to apply. Holland misses this object altogether. In neither case is the
possibility of excluding federal law vis-a-vis federal law examined as a
factor in making a choice of remedies.
Finally, if the proper relation of state and federal law is the controlling
criterion, there is no reason why McAllister should not apply to mari-
time wrongful death. The result should simply be that the survivors'
379 U.S. 148 (1964).
166Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 396 n. 12 (1970); accord,
Epling v. M. T. Epling, 435 F.2d 732, 736 (6th Cir. 1970). From the practical view-
point of the claimants, the effect of Moragne is to overrule Lindgren and Gillespie sub
silentio and make the Jones Act an operational nullity. Since the obligation of a ship
owner to his crew to provide a seaworthy vessel has been held to be substantially
greater than the duty imposed by ordinary negligence, it naturally follows that claimants
will choose the easiest road to recovery.
167 This conclusion may, of course, beg the question. See GILMORE & BLACK, AD-
MIRALTY 304 (1957). Nevertheless, there is authority for the proposition that the Jones
Act is not exclusive vis bL vis the Death on the High Seas Act. The analogy has con-
sistently been attributed to congressional intent, S. REP. No. 216, 66th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1920).
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unseaworthiness claim should be joined with the Jones Act negligence
claim. The narrow holding in McAllister is that when unseaworthiness
is combined with Jones Act negligence, a court cannot apply a shorter
state-created period of limitation for unseaworthiness than provided by
Congress in the Jones Act. Even with state law out of the picture, the
statutory limitation provided by Congress should control. Admiralty
courts traditionally have considered a related statutory provision as the
guide for decision. '
(c) Trial by Jury
Mr. Justice Harlan in Moragne did not discuss the issue of the right to
a jury trial under the new wrongful death action. The problem may be-
come complex, and, again, resort to state analogy may confuse the issue.
In diversity cases the issue of personal injury caused by unseaworthi-
ness, although maritime, has been submitted to a jury, ' and it may be
argued that the same procedure should be adopted for maritime death.
Close analysis suggests another basis. Whenever an unseaworthiness
claim is joined with a Jones Act claim in a diversity court, the jurisdic-
tion that attaches to the latter claim should also control the unseaworthi-
ness issue. Since the Jones Act provides for a trial by jury," ' the action
based upon the general maritime law should be no different, even though
the Jones Act is not made a part of the claim. Moreover, in Doucette v.
Vincent..' unseaworthiness was considered to be a federally-created doc-
trine, independent of the state-created right of action. Thus, it can be
argued that the right to a jury trial exists even without diversity. There
is language in Moragne to support this conclusion, indicating that anal-
ogy to maritime personal injury is appropriate in construing the mari-
time wrongful death remedy.7  The question is not jurisdictional; in-
stead, it is the propriety of the joinder of claims and the appropriate
method of trial for the different claims under the Jones Act, the Death
on the High Seas Act, or under the general maritime law. While there
is some evidence that the Court has treated the two as inseparable, the
law-equity cases illustrate that they are separate issues. ' Nevertheless,
the mode of trial should be resolved in the way "most conducive to the
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the business of the courts
168 See, e.g., Kenney v. Trinidad Corp., 349 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1965).
69 A. & G. Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355 (1962). See gen-
erally, Diamond, Maritime Personal Injury: What Court, Judge or Jury? 28 ALA. LAW.
387 (1967).
17046 U.S.C. 5 688 (1964).
171 194 F.2d 834 (1st Cir. 1952). But see Romero v. International Terminal Oper-
ating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
171 Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 406 (1970), cf. ALI STUDY
OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1319 at 37
(1969).
""
1See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
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... "'"' Since no jurisdictional problems are present, the question should
be resolved in favor of a jury trial for all claims, if for no other reason
than because the alternative presents unnecessary difficulties.' Perhaps
the strongest argument was made by Mr. Justice Black in Atlantic &
Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd."' In emphasizing the sanc-
tity of the jury finding in a suit for personal injuries brought against a
shipping company, he stated: "a search for one possible view of the cases
which will make the jury finding inconsistent results in a collision with
the Seventh Amendment."' "
The principal difficulty lies in cases brought in a federal court sitting
in admiralty. In the absence of diversity the courts have uniformly held
no right of a jury trial exists for claims arising under the general mari-
time law. 8 Nevertheless, for purposes of Moragne, since the rule does
not apply to actions for negligence brought under the Jones Act, a
"transactional"'' definition of maritime death is more appropriate, thus
securing the right to a jury trial for claims of unseaworthiness. This
reasoning was evidently behind Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co.'80
where the Court held that when a Jones Act negligence claim and a
claim for maintenance and cure are combined, both issues must be sub-
mitted to the jury. Although Fitzgerald concerned joinder of actions in
a personal injury claim, the reasoning is equally applicable to maritime
wrongful death actions.
(d) Survival Statutes
Perhaps the most vexing difficulty that can be injected into Moragne
concerns the survival of an action for pain and suffering of the decedent
prior to death. The problem was not considered by Mr. Justice Harlan
in Moragne probably because the decedent's death was instantaneous.
By denying the applicability of state law, however, proper use of the
uniformity principle should apply equally to state survival statutes. His-
torically, the maritime law, like the common law,' abated a tort claim
upon the death of the injured party or the tortfeasor,'8' and the prob-
lems raised by state survival statutes should be treated in the same man-
" Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437, 446 (2d Cir. 1959).
"I See Currie, The Silver Oar and All That, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1959).
178369 U.S. 355 (1962).
117 Id. at 364.
171 The Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796). See generally 5 J. MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 5 38.35[3], at 274-75 (2d ed. 1969).
I Note, 61 MIcH. L. REV. 1570, 1578 (1963).
180 374 U.S. 16, 21 (1962) (dictum).
"I' See notes 81-89 supra and accompanying text.
112 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Blidberg Rotchild Co., 167 F. Supp. 714, 715 (S.D.N.Y.
1958), cf. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 373 n. 35
(1959). But cf. The Columbia, 27 Fed. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1886); The Manhasset, 18 Fed.
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ner as the interrelation of state statutes and maritime law in wrongful
death cases.' For example, there is dicta appearing in The Harrisburg
that in no case could admiralty give greater rights for tortious death than
were available at common law.'" The reasoning overruling that case
should, therefore, also be applicable to the survival of remedies for per-
sonal injuries, unknown to the common law. Even so, there are subtle
distinctions between survival actions and claims for wrongful death,
which, if not properly limited, may create insurmountable difficulties
and reduce Moragne to a mockery.
A wrongful death action grants a new right to living persons who have
been damaged by the tortious death of the deceased. On the other hand,
a survival claim, rather than establishing an entirely new cause of action,
merely perpetuates those claims of the decedent existing prior to death.1"'
This difference has led to peculiar results. In Curtis v. Garcia & Cia
Ltda. '8 the survivor of a deceased longshoreman filed a claim for wrong-
ful death and for pain and suffering prior to death under the applicable
state statutes. The decedent was found contributorily negligent, however,
and recovery for his death was denied. Although reduced in proportion
to the decedent's negligence, recovery for pain and suffering was never-
theless allowed under the survival statute because the preserved claim
was "rooted in the general maritime law.'.. The Supreme Court also
held in Just v. Chambers8 that a state statute which preserved the claims
of an injured party should be recognized by the admiralty court notwith-
standing death. Technically, the statutes involved in those cases inter-
fered with the uniformity of Jensen and should have been held unconsti-
tutional. However, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in Just v. Chambers labeled
this analysis "a subtlety not meriting judicial adoption. 1.. Recogni-
tion of state survival legislation is therefore an example, akin to wrong-
ful death, in which a state statute extends maritime rights beyond the
maritime law.
Although the rationale of Moragne should easily remedy the situation,
it has not done so. In Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp.' claims were
filed under the Death on the High Seas Act and the Pennsylvania Sur-
918 (E.D. Va. 1884) Hollyday v. The David Reeves, 12 Fed. Cas. 386 (No. 6625)
(D. Md. 1879).
138 Cf. O'Leary v. United States Lines Co., 215 F.2d 708 (1st Cir. 1954).
184 119 U.S. at 213.
"'W. PROSSER, TORTS § 121, at 924 (3rd ed. 1964).
18 241 F.2d 30 (3rd Cir. 1957). But see Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317
U.S. 239 (1942). See generally, Comment, The Application of State Survival Statutes
in Maritime Causes, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 534 (1960).
"17241 F.2d at 36.
188 312 U.S. 383 (1941).
I" Id. at 391.
'No. 18,873 (3rd Cir., Feb. 26, 1971).
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vival Act for the deaths of two teen-age girls resulting from a crash of a
private airplane in international waters. The district court held that the
Death on the High Seas Act was not an exclusive basis of recovery and
could be supplemented by an award under a state survival act.'' On ap-
peal, the Third Circuit remanded the case, but on the surprising ground
that the record did not justify the amount of damages awarded. The
court permitted the state remedy. The basis of Judge Van Dusen's opin-
ion is strikingly similar to the "maritime but local" doctrine, as he ap-
pears to have considered recovery under state law as not producing "any
undesirable disuniformity in the scheme of maritime law.' '.. In so doing,
Moragne was reduced to a footnote and limited to "a particular class of
cases.'. 3 "A refusal to permit an award," he declared, "under the state
survival statute will result in a distinction between the recovery which
could be had on land and that on the high seas, a distinction which is
unreasonable and unnecessary.' '.. This is mere sophistry. It strains all
reason, and most precedent,'' to assert that state survival statutes can be
applied to accidents occurring outside the three-mile limit. Although
Garcia permitted wrongful death recovery brought under a state statute
on the ground that the action was "maritime but local,' "local" meant
within territorial waters. The use of the state statute in Dugas, therefore,
at the very least violates the doctrine of maritime uniformity. Notwith-
standing Moragne, if the maritime right abates with the death of one of
the parties, to allow its survival on the basis of state law clearly would
be an infringement upon the superior admiralty law. The "maritime but
local" exception simply does not apply, assuming arguendo that the doc-
trine is still good law. If the nature of the injury is maritime, the relation-
ship between the parties should be encompassed by the maritme law."'
Moreover, it makes no theoretical or practical sense to say that state
wrongful death statutes may not apply but that state survival statutes
will. If the distinction continues to be made the words of Professor Baer
seem particularly appropriate: "It is one of the paradoxes of our judicial
system that admiralty, the oldest body of law administered by our courts,
is the least understood .... "'
1'Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 310 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
'No. 18,874 at 10 (3rd Cir., Feb. 26, 1971), quoting Kossick v. United Fruit Co.,
365 U.S. 731, 739-40 (1961).
193 Id.
194Id.
... See, e.g., Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469, 476 (1922). But
see ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 103 (1939) ("local" refers to
the nature of the activity rather than locality). Cf. Note, Survival of Actions Brought
Under Federal Statutes, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 290 (1963).
'"6See Western Fuel v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
9 See Steamboat New World v. King, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 469 (1853), cf. The
Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
"08H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT, V. (2d ed. 1969).
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D. Maritime Tempests in Constitutional Teapots: The Proper Approach
The foregoing analysis is made simple by a delineation and accommo-
dation of state and federal competence through the negative control of
the general maritime law. Moragne, for example, makes clear that the
federal concern for maritime commerce, recognized by the constitutional
grant of admiralty jurisdiction, 9' encompasses recovery for maritime
death, induced by potentially differing standards of liability for the same
or similar conduct if state law is applied. The desirability of uniformity
becomes obvious. The difficult, often unanswerable, questions arise when
the federal courts shun their affirmative law making powers, fearing in-
trusion into areas of state competence in the absence of congressional
authorization. This is decision by indecision. The moral of Moragne is
that the uniform application of the law, even within the scope of state
power, is sine qua non to a viable federal system. In different contexts
the need for uniformity may be so pressing that the sole responsibility
for establishing it cannot feasibly be entrusted to a legislature.
Of course, inquiry into the area of federal-state competence involves
both the specific constitutional problem presented by Erie and the prob-
lem of the nature of the federal courts as an independent judicial sys-
tem. Frequent suggestions deny the latter absent express constitutional
or statutory provisions, but affirm it when declared by the admiralty
courts."' Any distinction based on some qualitative differentiation be-
tween diversity and admiralty courts, however, is meaningless.
Erie rests solely upon the principle that state courts should have the
power to determine the scope and effectiveness of rights created by the
states within the scope of their constitutional powers."1 Thus, Erie, Jen-
sen and Moragne share the common requirement that the same substan-
tive law be applied if the only consideration is whether the case is tried
in a state or federal court. But Erie commands that both courts apply
state law, while Jensen and Moragne require the uniform application of
federal law. The difference is argued as attributable to the opposite de-
velopment of the two jurisdictional grants: while the constitutional grant
to the federal courts in "Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction"
authorizes a judicial declaration of the substantive maritime law, °' the
statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction does not." However, close anal-
ysis reveals the federal judiciary creates maritime principles that must
199 Cf. Black, supra note 50 at 280.
200 See, e.g., Currie, supra note 9 at 162-63.
201 See notes 10-13 supra and accompanying text.
202 See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960) (dissenting opinion)
("No area of federal law is judge-made at its source to such an extent as is the law of
admiralty.").
" Currie, supra note 9 at 163. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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be applied uniformly, regardless of their source and notwithstanding the
constitutional grant. These principles are merely another form of federal
common law, disguised under the general maritime law.'" The Supreme
Court has said as much in Kossick v. United Fruit Co."° Mr. Justice
Harlan, considering the question whether a contract, although maritime,
was of such a local nature that state law should apply, said that what was
involved was not peculiar to admiralty, but rather another aspect of fed-
eralism. His solution was a "weighing" of the interests akin to the process
of resolving any other conflict between state and national governments. '
It is difficult to argue against this approach. While interests in uniformity
should not create a bias against state law, persons engaged in maritime
commerce should be able to rely on the application of a single law in
planning their conduct and business. In Kossick, for example, the Court
held that a maritime contract is not subject to a state Statute of Frauds.
The policy behind the decision is the need for definitive rules upon which
to rely in maritime commerce. If the justification for the existence of a
separate admiralty jurisdiction is because the maritime industry requires
the application of a body of law expressing particular expertise," ' a uni-
form law protecting the industry from the provincial intrusion of the
states seems most defensible with regard to contractual obligations.!00
The same reasoning applies to maritime personal injury and death. 9 On
the other hand, if the situation does not present a demand for a uniform
rule, there is little need to sacrifice the kind of flexibility that the bal-
ancing of state and federal interests implies.
The inversion of the attitudes expressed in Erie for maritime cases
works well when the identification of the purposes for admiralty jurisdic-
tion is the object of concern, but poorly when the justification is, for
example, judicial construction of legislation rather than independent
judicial law-making. Further, the process prevents the bizarre choice-of-
laws consequences that would result from an arbitrary decision to follow
state law or from a mere accident of admiralty jurisdiction. 10
204 Cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 308 (1947).
205365 U.S. 731 (1961).
mo See generally, Traynor, Conflict of Laws: Professor Currie's Restrained and En-
lightened Forum, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 845, 852 (1961), cf. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona,
325 U.S. 761 (1945) (interstate commerce).
207 See generally, MacChesney, Marine Insurance and the Substantive Admiralty
Law: A Comment on the Wilburn Boat Company Case, 57 MICH. L. REv. 555 (1959).
208But cf. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
'* See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
210 See, e.g., Scott v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 979 (1968); Safir v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 241 F. Supp. 501 (E.D.
N.Y. 1965). See generally White, A Deadly Conflict in the Admiralty Law, 29 U. PITr.
L. REV. 655 (1968).
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III. THE AVIATION EXPERIENCE
A. Jurisdictional Teapots
One substantial consideration flowing from Moragne is that the mari-
time grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts, the absence in the states
of any complete system of maritime law and remedies, and the national
and international tradition of the maritime law as a separate corpus of
law, have combined to induce a uniform development of maritime prin-
ciples in the federal courts. These considerations are independent of
state territorial waters. Nevertheless, the arbitrary character of jurisdic-
tional boundaries cuts two ways. A tortious act occurring upon navigable
waters will be cognizable in admiralty notwithstanding the lack of mari-
time connection."' Conversely, if the tort occurs on land it will be held
to be non-maritime even though the connection with the maritime in-
dustry is complete.' Thus, the shoreline is as potentially arbitrary as
the three-mile limit for determining the applicable law. In this situation
the application of a uniform federal law causes the very distinction that
the doctrine of uniformity seeks to prevent. Aircraft crashes in territorial
waters illustrate the morass caused by resort to this sort of analysis.
1. State Waters
In Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. ' claims on the behalf of seven
decedent passengers as a result of a crash into the territorial waters of
Massachusetts were filed against an air carrier and its equipment manu-
facturers in a Pennsylvania federal court sitting in admiralty. The com-
plaint was brought under the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts wrongful
death statutes and alleged negligence in the operation, maintenance, in-
spection and manufacture of the airplane. A contract claim charged
breach of the warranties of safety and airworthiness. The district court
dismissed the actions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the
grounds that in order to be within the admiralty jurisdiction torts must
occur in a maritime locality and have "some maritime connection;" con-
tracts must be concerned with maritime transactions."' In reversing, the
211 See Penn. Tanker Co. v. United States, 409 F.2d 514, 518 (5th Cir. 1969); Fire-
man's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Boston Harbor Marina, 406 F.2d 917 (1st Cir. 1969);
Bible v. Chevron Oil Co., 308 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. La. 1969); Helton v. United States,
309 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. Ark. 1969). See also The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20
(1866); cf. Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. 395 U.S. 352 (1969) (dictum). But see
O'Connor & Co. v. City of Pascogoula, 304 F. Supp. 681, 683 (S.D. Miss. 1969). For a
criticism of the strict localty test, see 7A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE .325 (Supp.
1970).
"' See Kimble v. Noble Drilling Corp., 416 F.2d 847, 850 (5th Cir. 1969) (dictum).
21316 F.2d 758 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
214 Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 430, 433-34 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
A claim against the United States was dismissed on the grounds that the Federal Tort
Claims Act does not confer admiralty jurisdiction. Cf. Steamtug Aladdin, Inc. v. City
of Boston, 163 F. Supp. 499 (D. Mass. 1958).
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Third Circuit held that the locality of the injury is the exclusive criterion
for jurisdiction over maritime torts, and that a wrongful death action
arising out of a plane crash in territorial waters is within the jurisdiction
of the federal admiralty courts. But, realistically, to invoke the admiralty
jurisdiction absent a meaningful determination that the transactiton or
occurrance is in fact maritime is not to invoke the admiralty jurisdiction
at all. Admiralty jurisdiction was not created in the abstract; if the test
is the sole criterion essential to its application, its purpose is discarded
by its rule. For example, if the reasoning of Dugas is followed and held
applicable in cases as Weinstein, a finding of admiralty jurisdiction
would mean that actions for death and injuries caused by the same
crash again would be governed by two different bodies of law. 15 If, on
the other hand, the action is brought in a state court or on the law
side of the federal court, the conflict of laws problems could be monu-
mental." ' Under traditional choice of law principles, one state court can
limit recovery for another's accident."' However, an admiralty court
following Dugas might be disposed to apply a state statute that imposes
no limit on recovery, even though the enforced statute would not in haec
verba extend beyond the forum state. In any case, continuing to hear
similar claims in admiralty can only serve to either perpetuate a mechan-
ical application of admiralty jurisdiction or establish a strained fiction
that an airplane is a maritime vessel."' In addition, a mechanical, though
simple, application of Moragne, invoked because a crash occurs in
navigable waters, fails to properly accommodate the federal interest in
aviation. The federal concern for maritime safety is clearly encompassed
by the federal concern for maritime commerce but not air commerce. A
better solution lies in the uniform treatment of aviation disasters, invoked
notwithstanding the purpose of admiralty jurisdiction."'
2. The High Seas
Although, arguably, airplane accidents occurring on the high seas are
free from the complications of federalism, the liability problem is still
left to the irrelevant jurisdictional distinctions of whether death occurred
on the high seas, on land or in the air."' Admiralty jurisdiction over
21 See, e.g., United States v. Northwest Airline Service, Inc., 80 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.
1935). But cf. Veeder, The Legal Relation Between Aviation and Admiralty, 2 AIR. L.
REV. 29 (1931).
2'Note, 49 TEx. L. REV. 128, 133 (1970).
"'See Currie, The Choice Among State Laws in Maritime Death Cases, 21 VAND.
L. REV. 297 (1968).
2 8 See 7A J. MOoRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 .220 (Supp. 1970).
21 Cf. Comment, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 907, 922 (1955). But see Hornsby v. the Fish
Meal Co., 431 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1970).
"'See Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 154 F. Supp. 162, 164 (S.D.N.Y.
1956), aft'd on other grounds, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957);
Reinhard v. Newport Flying Service Corp., 232 N.Y. 115, 118, 133 N.E. 371, 372
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airplanes has been sustained in a number of cases arising under the Death
on the High Seas Act. 21 The statute, creating a cause of action for death
occurring beyond one marine league from shore and providing for ex-
clusive jurisdiction in the admiralty courts, has been applied to plane
crashes at sea on the basis of the statutory language" and the locality
test.2' " It has even been applied to a case in which the airplane never
touched the water, the court holding that the statute created a new cause
of action not dependent on strict locality." ' The fallacy of these cases is
that the Death on the High Seas Act antedated transoceanic air com-
merce, a development that creates a jurisdictional vacuum. Thus, even
though remedial legislation should be construed liberally, the phrase "in
admiralty" appearing in the statute is more indicative of a Congressional
intent to limit coverage than to expand it.2 ' Furthermore, even under
the view that the statute does not erase the strict locality test but simply
brings an exceptional situation within admiralty's cognizance, since avi-
ation has historically been treated as a sui generis subject,"' more than
the accident of locality should be required to invoke admiralty jurisdic-
tion. There simply is no justification for extending this special juris-
diction to torts unrelated to the conduct of the shipping industry and in
which an admiralty court has no special competence.' 7
(1921) (". . . the function of movement in the water is auxiliary and secondary. That
is, indeed, a reason why the jurisdiction of the admiralty should be excluded when the
activities proper to the primary function [air movement] are the occasion of the mis-
chief."). See also Note, 29 J. AIR. L. & CoM. 102, 104 (1958).
... Blumenthal v. United States, 306 F.2d 16 (3rd Cir. 1962); D'Aleman v. Pan Am.
World Airways, 259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958); Bergeron v. Aero Associates, Inc., 213
F. Supp. 936 (E.D. La. 1963); Noel v. Airponents, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 348 (D.N.J.
1958); Stiles v. National Airlines, 161 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. La. 1958), afl'd, 268 F.2d
400 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959); Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 12f
F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1954); Sierra v. Pan Am. World Airways, 107 F. Supp. 519
(D.P.R. 1952); Lacey v. L. W. Wiggins Airways, 95 F. Supp. 916 (D. Mass. 1951).
22 See, e.g., D'Aleman v. Pan Am. World Airways, 259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958).
12 See, e.g., Lavello v. Kanko, 175 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
"14 D'Aleman v. Pan Am. World Airways, 259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958). The con-
curring opinion asserted that admiralty jurisdiction had been expanded to air space over
the high seas. Id at 496. See also Notarian v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 244 F. Supp.
874 (W.D. Pa. 1965). Contra, Sierra v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 519
(D.P.R. 1952); Ledet v. United Aircraft Corp., 10 N.Y.2d 258, 176 N.E.2d 820, 219
N.Y.S.2d 245 (1961) (per curiam).
225 See 59 Cong. Rec. 4482-86 (1920). In Higa v. Tranocean Airlines, 230 F.2d 780
(9th Cir. 1955), the court concluded in construing the Act that if Higa's diversity pro-
ceeding at common law were permitted by the Death on the High Seas Act, it would
make superfluous the words "in admiralty" appearing in the statute. But see Choy v.
Pan Am. Airways, Inc., (1941) A.M.C. 483 (S.D.N.Y.), cf. Middleton v. Luckenbach
S.S. Co., 70 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1934).
2 See United States v. Northwest Air Serv., Inc., 80 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1935) (sea-
plane stored in a hanger not subject to a maritime lein); United States v. Cordova, 89
F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1950) (assault in an airplane over the high seas not actionable
in admiralty because a plane is not a vessel and admiralty does not extend to air space);
Strickrod v. Pan American Airways Co., (1941) Av. Rep. 69 (S.D.N.Y.) (crew mem-
bers of an airplane lost at sea are not seamen within the meaning of the Jones Act).
'
2 See 49 U.S.C. S 1509(a) (1964), formerly 49 U.S.C. § 177(a) (1952) ("the
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Of course, the influence of the maritime law on the law of the air has
not been entirely accidental; it is logical that the rights and duties of the
"sea of the air ... should bear some relation to the law of the sea, as it is
more conventionally understood. 22. But the result should be a corollary
to, not a strict application of, the maritime law. It is as absurd to deter-
mine recovery based on whether the victim was killed on land or water
as it is to determine recovery based on whether the victim was killed one
mile or ten miles from shore. Thus, the philosophy of a federal common
law action for wrongful death should be extended, not upon the criterion
of locality, but by the nature of the interests involved. Air commerce is
not, or should not be, any different than maritime commerce when iden-
tifying these interests.
B. The Rationale for Implementation
A successful operation of a federal program of aviation requiring a
national, uniform system of rights and obligations also demands a simple
yet effective method of implementing the decisional rules. However,
the search for standards can be as formidable as overcoming the state
interest. It is one thing to assert that uniformity is necessary and quite
another to achieve it."' The chief difficulties are first, judicial recogni-
tion of implied bases of recovery from the provisions of the Federal
Aviation Act,"' and second, the complications of jurisdiction arising
from both the nature of the federal courts and the concurrent power
to the states to hear cases involving federally created rights."' The re-
maining discussion will focus on these problems and propose an alterna-
tive approach.
1. The Federal Aviation Act
The primary source of aviation law is the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 and the large body of regulations governing the qualification,
certification and operation of aircraft. Since the statute and regulations
do not expressly create civil liability," a constant source of disagreement
navigation and shipping laws of the United States . . . shall not be construed to apply
to seaplanes or other aircraft. ... ). See also Black, supra note 50 at 264.
"' Junkeman, Airline Litigation From a Defendant's Point of View, 36 INs. COUN-
SEL J. 38 (1969). See also Moore & Palaez, Admiralty Jurisdiction-The Sky's the
Limit, 33 J. AIR. LAw & CoM. 3 (1965); Note, 22 VAND L. REV. 651 (1969).
"'See Note, 82 HARV. L. REV. 479, 482 (1968).
23 49 U.S.C. §§ 201-1505 (1964). Compare Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200
F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961) with Yelineyk v. Woley, 284 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Va.
1968), cf. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) ("[w]here federally protected rights
have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that the courts will be alert
to . . . grant the necessary relief."). See generally Note, Implying Civil Remedies from
Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REV. 285, 291-92 (1963).
2" Compare Rohr Aircraft Corp. v. County of San Diego, 51 Cal. 2d 759, 336 P*2d
521 (1959), rev'd, 362 U.S. 628 (1960), with People ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 294 N.Y.
61, 60 N.E.2d 541 (1945), aff'd, 326 U.S. 496 (1946).
m See, e.g., Dice v. Akron, C.&Y. R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
1971]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
among the courts is whether to imply civil remedies for violations of
the provisions or to allow a remedy only if provided by state law." The
most forceful argument against implication is that the statute is regula-
tory legislation, tempered by administrative discretion; a court is not
charged with the same responsibility for administering the statute. 4
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to argue that language granting federal
power over a particular subject may have a wider meaning than the
context of an easily amendable statute. Two cases are illustrative of the
development.
In Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airway, Inc." and Wills v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc.' the courts implied a civil remedy from the
anti-discrimination and unreasonable preference provisions of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act."' Wills involved a ticketholder barred from an over-
sold flight because his accommodations were given to a first-class pas-
senger. Although the statute provided only for injunctive and criminal
sanctions, the court awarded actual and punitive damages, holding that
"specific statutory authority is not an essential prequisite to the existence
of power in the Federal courts to grant relief in damages to enforce the
object or purpose of a particular statute . . . .""' In Fitzgerald civil relief
for racial discrimination was awarded, the court emphasizing that the
administrative relief provided by the statute. was inadequate because
of the prospective nature of the relief and the absence of provisions for
restitution of past wrongs.
On the other hand, equally as reasonable is the assertion that had
Congress intended that a violation of the statute serve as a federal basis
for recovery, it would have expressly provided for civil relief. For ex-
ample, there is no circumventing the criminal nature of the statute
construed by Wills and Fitzgerald. Accordingly, some courts have held
that to read the statute otherwise results in unnecessary and strained
reasoning."' In Rosdail v. Western Aviation'. a district court refused to
"See note 230 supra.
'a Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Regulatory Statutes, 77 HAv. L. REV. 285,
291 (1963).
2 229 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1956).
218 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
0749 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1964):
No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall make, give, or cause any undue or unreason-
able preference or advantage to any particular person, port, locality, or description of
traffic in air transportation in any respect whatsoever or subject any particular person,
port, locality, or description of traffic in air transportation to any unjust discrimination
or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.
2s8200 F. Supp. 360, 364 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
3949 U.S.C. § 1482(c) (1964).
"' See Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947); Note, 45 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 560, 563 (1970).
241 297 F. Supp. 681 (D. Colo. 1969).
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impute a pilot's negligence to the owner and lessor of an aircraft by the
"operation of aircraft" provision of the statute.' Wills and Fitzgerald
expressly were not followed because of "a lack of Congressional in-
tent. 2. 3 The court ruled that the committee report merely recognized the
possibility of a construction of the statute which would place civil lia-
bility on the airplane owners." The court further noted that the federal
aviation program merely regulated the licensing, inspection and registra-
tion of aircraft and airmen and made no provision for its application to
tort liability.'
Statutory construction aside, the problems involved in implying a
civil remedy under the statute are not exhausted by holding that the
express provisions are the only means of relief available to an injured
party. In fact, deciding whether to imply a remedy is even more difficult
when placed in the narrow context of a search for legislative intent.4
An example is the regulation enacted by the Civil Aeronautic Board
since Fitzgerald and Wills that provides redress under the statute as an
alternative to an action based on breach of contract.2 " The existance
of this regulation makes it probable that Congress did not intend the
terms of the statute as the only means of relief available to an injured
party. Moreover, especially when federally protected rights are violated,
it is likely that the courts will adjust their remedies in order to grant
relief, thus implying a civil remedy even though the federal statute does
not expressly create one. 8
Although adopting a process of implication does not present an in-
surmountable inconsistancy, Wills and Fitzgerald have been directly
refuted on jurisdictional grounds. In Moungey v. Brandt2" an injured
s49 U.S.C. § 1301(26) (1964); accord, Rodgers v. Ray Gardner Flying Service,
435 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3347 (U.S. Feb. 2, 1971)
(No. 1318).
" 297 F. Supp. at 687.
2 l"d. at 685.
I ld. at 684-85.
See Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv.
L. REv. 285, 291 (1963).
"
7 See 14 C.F.R. § 250.4 (1967):
[E]very carrier shall file tariffs providing compensation to a passenger holding confirmed
reserved space who presents himself for carriage at the appropriate time and place,
having complied fully with the carrier's requirements as to ticketing, checking and re-
confirmation procedures and being acceptable for transportation under the carrier's
tariff, and the flight for which the passenger holds confirmed reserved space is unable to
accommodate the passenger and departs without him.
I In Gomez v. Fla. State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969), migra-
tory farm workers sought relief against state officials and a private agricultural em-
ployer, alleging violations of federal standards governing the working conditions sup-
plied by the federal-state employment services. The Fifth Circuit sustained the district
court's ruling that the federal statutes impliedly provide a civil remedy to the members
of a protected class. Cf. Roosevelt Field, Inc. v. Town of N. Hempstead, 84 F. Supp. 465
(E.D.N.Y. 1949).
2 250 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Wis. 1966).
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passenger alleged that her injuries were caused by the negligence of the
defendant who had violated several regulations under the statute. In
dismissing the petition for failure to state a claim the court held that
the broad implication doctrine was both unneeded and unfounded.
Fitzgerald was distinguished as a violation of protected civil rights; a
criminal sanction fortified by a civil remedy was necessary in order to
vindicate the public's right of freedom of travel, an interest not present
in other regulation violations."'
There are further, more subtle problems. Wills, for example, has been
criticized because of the court's award of punitive as well as compensa-
tory damages." 1 Since the right of a federal cause of action is only im-
plied under the statute, there is a fortiori no express provision in the
statute for an award of exemplary damages. The consequent danger of
the possibility of enormous liability as well as being contrary to authority
with respect to punitive damages creates a tenuous inferential basis of
decision." '
The problem of what type of violations will be redressable within the
meaning of the statute also presents particular difficulties. The treat-
ment given all passengers need not be identical; weather conditions,"
eligibility of the passenger for relief," or incapacity" are factors that
give rise to special treatment. If these considerations promote burden-
some and unnecessary litigation, the very uniformity that is sought is
undermined and the federal courts may be as inadequate to provide
consistent relief as the state courts.
Only one court has held that a duty is created under a federal statute
on the ground it is essential to federal policy, despite congressional
failure to create the duty. In Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co.' a complaint alleging negligence and breach of a broadcasting
contract was filed in federal court under the Federal Communications
Act of 193457 and section 1337 of the Judicial Code providing for juris-
diction over actions "arising under any Act of Congress regulating com-
"°Id. at 452. See also Yelinek v. Worley, 284 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Va. 1968); Porter
v. Southeastern Aviation, Inc. 191 F. Supp. 42 (N.D. Miss. 1960); cf. Dennis v. South-
eastern Aviation, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Tenn. 1959).
"' Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L. REv. 285,
298 (1963).
12 See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184
(1912).
11 Stough v. North Central Airlines, Inc., 55 Ill. App.2d 338, 204 N.E.2d 792 (1965).
254 14 C.F.R. § 250.6 (1967).
255 Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
-6 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968); cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) (duties created by federal decisional rules, but authorized by
Congress).
25747 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1964).
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merce...2 ' Finding that Congress intended a uniform rule governing
standards of service in the regulation of interstate telephones, the Second
Circuit held that the claims were governed by federal common law, and
thus supportable under section 1331 of the Judicial Code." Unfortu-
nately, the court only indirectly explained the source of its power to
provide remedies as a matter of federal decisional law. Chief Judge
Lumbard concluded that there was a traditional separation of cases of
maritime jurisdiction and suits of a civil nature at common law; thus
Romero was held inapplicable "to claims founded on federal common
law outside the admiralty area.... 0 In Judge Lumbard's view a policy of
uniform rates simply could not exist if the standards of service were
determined by divergent state laws. This interpretation of "laws" in
section 1331 is unquestionably novel, though supportable. Funda-
mentally, the basic premise of federal question jurisdiction is to mini-
mize the danger of hostile state decisions toward federally created
rights." ' It is entirely reasonable that judicially created rights should be
extended the same protection as those created by statute. Further,
greater control to insure uniformity that would otherwise frustrate a
congressional purpose can best be achieved by granting federal courts
jurisdiction over these issues. Still, it is unfortunate that Judge Lumbard
did not discuss the factors that should be included in areas solely control-
led by federal common law. Since the decision extends the federal com-
mon law to issues involving tort and contract-areas traditionally
thought to be best decided by reference to state law-a logical result
could lead to a total eclipse of Erie. However, in an earlier opinion in
which Judge Lumbard himself joined, the Second Circuit held that
questions of breach of contract involving a merger between two interstate
trucking firms were to be decided by state law,'2 although the field was
comprehensively regulated by Congress.' Judge Lumbard in Ivy dis-
missed this case on the ground that there was nothing to indicate "a
congressional policy that breaches of such contracts should be ruled by
uniform federal principles .. ."'" He did not explain, however, why the
federal interest is greater in one case than in the other. Thus, the appli-
cation of the same standards leading to inconsistent results demonstrates
2128 U.S.C. § 1337 (1964).
"I d.: "The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all actions wherein the
matter in controversy . . . arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States."
26 391 F.2d at 493.
'See, e.g., Paduano v. Yamashita Kinh Kabushiki Kaisha, 221 F.2d 615, 618 (2d
Cir. 1955).
" McFaddin Express, Inc. v. Adley Corp., 346 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 1026 (1966).
11 Note, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 425, 428 (1968-69).
261391 F.2d at 490.
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the need for more definite guidelines for determining the scope of the
federal common law. Specifically, without an express determination
(1) that there is a substantial divergence of state law, (2) that this
divergence is likely to create a serious diversity, and (3) that the federal
interest in uniformity clearly outweighs the states' interest in applying
their law, a decision based on federal interest will lead to non-predictable
and questionable results.
2. Preemption
Although the courts in Fitzgerald, Wills and Ivy did not rely on the
doctrine, there is authority for the proposition that federal preemption
can serve as a guideline for determining the applicability of the federal
common law. ' " Preemption indicates a federal supremacy over state
law and imposes an obligation to refer to the federal common law in
dealing with questions not specifically answered by the statute, despite
congressional failure to cover all questions. " The designation is danger-
ous. Although a congressional policy favoring uniformity may exist,
the creation of a federal right implied from a regulatory statute singular-
ly lacks a network of common law duties at the federal level.
The easily confused notions of preemption and implication apparently
were the basis of the Fifth Circuit's holding in Rodgers v. Ray Gardner
Flying Service, Inc."' In substance, the problem was whether the defini-
tion of an "operator" under the Federal Aviation Act2. preempted the
state law of bailments, thus rendering the owner of an aircraft vicariously
liable for the negligence of the pilot. The complaint was filed in a federal
court under a state wrongful death statute, but alledged that the federal
statute formed the basis for the cause of action, notwithstanding state
court rulings that the negligence of a bailee of an aircraft may not be
imputed to the bailor. ' Quite understandably, the Fifth Circuit reversed
the district court's denial of the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, holding that the provisions of the federal statute were not intended
to preempt state laws of bailment in providing that an owner-lessor is
responsible for the negligence of a pilot-lessee. The puzzling aspect of
the case, however, is the court's dismissal of the argument that Moragne
dictates that a wrongful death action may be brought for the alleged
breach of federally declared aviation standards even in the absence of
2" See generally, Hill, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional
Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967).
2 See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Clear-
field Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); Dietrick v. Greany, 309 U.S. 190
(1940).
267435 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1970), petition for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3347 (U.S.
Feb. 2, 1971) (No. 1318).
28649 U.S.C. § 1301(26) (1964).
26See, e.g., Spartan Aircraft Co. v. Jamison, 181 Okla. 645, 75 P.2d 1096 (1938).
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a remedy under state law."' The court determined that the development
of the power of the federal government under the Constitution for de-
claring the maritime law was "strickingly dissimilar" from a "more
stringent rule that federal preemption under the commerce clause will
not be presumed in the absence of a clear indication of the intent of
Congress..... The potential effect of the rationale of this statement on
state substantive law and the doctrine of Moragne is unnecessarily strict.
The language betrays a desire for uniform standards of liability, but with
a corresponding erosion of the importance and effect of federal judicial
power involving interests of national concern. If the accident occurred
on water, there is no question that an action could be instituted for
wrongful death independent of any enabling statutes."7 Although the
court may have properly restricted the Federal Aviation Act as "not by
indirection requiring the circuitous reasoning plaintiffs find themselves
driven to employ . . .""' it is difficult to believe that a state wrongful
death statute must be looked to as the basis for a cause of action in
aviation wrongful death cases.
3. The Proper Standards
Any attempt to remedy the confusion caused by distinguishing mari-
time wrongful death recovery from aviation death cases will ultimately
fail if the sole criterion is legislation tailor-made to meet the problem.
Thus, following Moragne, a single application of a uniform mode of
recovery for aviation disasters will afford equal protection only through
established judicial interpretation apart from considerations of juris-
dictional nicities and ambiguous legislative intent. So understood, all
the problems inherent in Dugas, Fitzgerald, Ivy and Rodgers can easily
be avoided.
The Death on the High Seas Act provides a ready-made foundation
upon which to build because of both the nature of the statute and its
prior applicability to aviation wrongful death cases.
(a) Beneficiaries
The Death on the High Seas Act extends a death action to "any per-
son," encompassing both maritime and aviation survivors, and provides
for apportionment between possible beneficiaries."7 Although the Court
in Moragne does not indicate the proper party to enforce the remedy,
an anology to the statute is suggested.' Since just compensation would
270 435 F.2d at 1390.
271 Id.
272 Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970); accord, Leroy v.
United Air Lines, Inc.
273435 F.2d at 1389.
274 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1964) provides that the personal representative may sue for the
exclusive benefit of the deceden't's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative.
275 398 U.S. at 406-08.
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appear to be the legitimate goal of any award, an apportionment based
upon the particular circumstance of each case seems appropriate, regard-
less of whether the tort is maritime or involves aviation.
(b) Liability and Damages
The "wrongful act, neglect or default" standard of care as interpreted
by the Court is capable of supporting both unseaworthiness for mari-
time deaths and negligence claims for aviation disasters. Moreover, the
standards of the Federal Aviation Regulations have uniformly been held
to be evidence of negligence... and there is no reason why they could not
be incorporated in aviation cases, consistant with the congressional
desire to promote air safety under the Federal Aviation Act. In addition,
the procedures developed for maritime injuries, with the contributory
negligence of the decedent functioning to reduce recovery, are adapt-
able to aviation situations.
Finally, the various elements of recovery, discussed in the above
analysis of Moragne, '" should be equally applicable to air commerce.
At a minimum the implications of Moragne support an inference that
any gaps existing in wrongful death legislation should be filled without
reference to state law. The myriad other items specifically provided for
in federal and state enactments are thus readily solvable if the funda-
mental purpose of promoting air commerce is balanced against the
varied provisions of state law.
C. The Uncertainty of a New Rule
The final consideration concerns the effect of "the no-man's land of
undeveloped law" '78 in implementing a federal cause of action for wrong-
ful death involving aviation. Obviously, the use of a federal rule may
itself invoke uncertainty, at least for awhile; it will take time before rules
are settled, even by the courts of appeals. In this regard, at first glance
it would appear that a formidable obstacle exists to achieving decisional
uniformity. By the nature of the judicial system, the decisions of the
federal district courts are not binding upon each other." The decisions
of the circuit courts are binding upon the district courts within the re-
spective circuits... but are not binding upon each other. Therefore, only
a decision by the Supreme Court can assure complete uniformity of
a federal common law; yet it is unlikely that the Court could effectively
develop detailed substantive decisional rules. 8' This situation, however,
is not as serious a detriment as may first appear. Decisions of circuit
2" See, e.g., Hough v. Rapid Air, Inc., 298 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. 1957).
277 See notes 141-198 supra and accompanying text.
278 Zousmer v. Canadian Pac. Air Lines, 307 F. Supp. 892, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
271 See, e.g., Poole v. Stevens, 190 F. Supp. 938 (E.D. Mich. 1960).
281 See, e.g., In re S. T. Foods, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
281 Cf. Note, 65 HARV. L. REv. 107 (1951).
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courts unify federal law in large areas, and only when these courts have
failed to produce a uniform rule must the Supreme Court resolve any
conflicts."' The absence of certainty is not of overwhelming importance
in this context. The major end sought is not uniformity per se, but rather
a sympathetic handling of a federal program. In this area there is sub-
stantial gain even from uniformity within the circuits.
A second obstacle is that, jurisdictionally, cases involving federally
created rights often arise in state courts. This situation theoretically
presents no greater problem than does the obstacle in the federal court
system itself. A state court decision on a federal question is reviewable
by the Supreme Court and its determination is binding."3 Nevertheless,
the same practical consideration of Supreme Court review of federal
decisions is applicable to state court decisions. It would therefore appear
that unless state courts heed federal court decisions announcing federal
common law, uniformity cannot exist. But if the state courts focus atten-
tion to federal decisions and defer to them whenever possible, the prob-
lem is alleviated. In fact, examination of state court cases involving
federal interests shows that the state courts choose the precedent which
they believe to be most likely to produce the results of a federal pro-
gram. 8 The problem is more theoretical than real.
IV. CONCLUSION
The federal courts are charged to render justice in cases that come
before them. Necessarily, there must be areas of conduct where much is
left for judicial balancing of competing interests. Aviation accidents are
an example. The school of thought that has frequently called for the
application of state law in deference to Erie is inadequate. First, the
idea of basing decisions upon wide-ranging inquiries into governmental
and private concerns is not incongruous with counsels of judicial re-
straint. In aviation litigation if a federal court must ignore the power to
fashion a nationwide rule only because of the lack of defined congres-
sional standards, there is a reversion to the uncertainties condemned
from the beginning. We are dealing with a restricted area of singular
federal concern, not with the whole range of private law. Because the
very nature of aviation litigation usually solves the problem of federal
jurisdiction over the subject matter, most of the litigation is likely
to be in the federal courts. These courts, in turn, have the unique op-
portunity to develop a set of rules that will identify the federal interest
or that will determine which issues shall be left to state law in the absence
282See ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES § 322 (Wolfson & Kurland 2d ed. 1951).
283BLACK, LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS 336-46 (1912).
284 See, e.g., Ruggiero v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 272 App. Div. 1027, 74 N.Y.S.2d
428 (2d Dep't 1947).
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of a demand for national uniformity. Moreover, since the subject
matter is of federal concern, state courts will be more willing to heed
decisions of the federal courts, and the problems of jurisdiction can
easily be avoided.
The problem of "federalism" was solved for the maritime industry by
a combination of factors demanding a uniform application of traditional
principles of admiralty. The analogy to the national and international
origins of the maritime laws is compelling. Unlike the maritime indus-
try, however, the aviation industry suffers from neology. Unless the
federal interest in an industry primarily engaged in interstate and inter-
national commerce is recognized as a basis for the courts to perform
centrally in the elaboration of a uniform rule, the barriers resulting from
divergence of opinion of the proper state-national relationship insure
that determinate rules will vary from case to case, from plaintiff to
plaintiff, according to factors characterized by unpredictability.
